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Articles
Privacy Harms
IGNACIO N. COFONE* & ADRIANA Z. ROBERTSON**
Privacy loss is central to privacy law scholarship, but a clear definition of the concept
remains elusive. We present a model that both captures the essence of privacy loss and
can be easily applied to policy evaluations and doctrinal debates. To do so, we use
standard Bayesian statistics to formalize a key intuition: that information privacy is
fundamentally linked to how much other people know about you. A key advantage of
our model is that, for the first time, it takes privacy preferences seriously while
maintaining tractability. Another key advantage is that, by viewing privacy as a
continuum, it is more realistic and is better suited for evaluating “gray areas” than
prior models.
We apply this framework to two central areas of privacy law: the common law
privacy tort and the Fourth Amendment’s third party doctrine. In the tort context, we
first show how our proposal helps to clarify current law, and then use it to distinguish
between the two interests protected by the privacy tort: privacy interests and
reputational interests. We then propose a simple framework for judges to use in
providing remedies for both classes of claims. We then move on to the third party
doctrine. We show that many of the shortcomings associated with the doctrine stem
from the misguided assumption that privacy is dichotomous rather than a spectrum,
as in our model. We then liken this to the standard of care familiar from tort law, and
show how the current doctrine results in the equivalent of a strict liability standard,
rather than a more appropriate negligence-based standard.
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INTRODUCTION
Most people care about their privacy. For example, less than three
months into the year, a Google news search for “privacy 2018” returned
131,000,000 results.1 Yet despite the importance of information privacy
in modern society, privacy harms are hard to pin down. This, in turn,
creates challenges for information privacy law, since a clear conception
of these harms is essential for determining both standing and remedies.
As a leading information privacy law casebook put it: “an overarching
issue in privacy cases is whether the privacy violation caused any harm
. . . in both data security breach cases and privacy cases, courts have
struggled to recognize [such] harm.”2 Unfortunately, information privacy
is hard to pin down.
Scholars have approached privacy in two different ways.3 Drawing
on insights from economics, philosophy and sociology, the first approach
focuses on the normative value of privacy, and tries to answer the
question of why (or if) privacy is valuable. For example, while
philosophers have argued that privacy is necessary for developing
identity,4 or for autonomy,5 economists¾primarily concerned with

1. Privacy 2018 (Search Term), GOOGLE NEWS, https://www.google.ca/search?q=privacy+2018
&source=lnms&tbm=nws (last visited Apr. 21, 2018).
2. See DANIEL SOLOVE AND ALAND SCHWARTZ, INFORMATION PRIVACY LAW 807 (6th ed. 2017); id.
at 811 (“standing has been a particularly challenging issue in privacy cases, with many such cases being
dismissed for lack of standing because of courts concluding that plaintiffs have not suffered harm.”);
see also In Re Google Inc. Privacy Policy Litigation, 2013 WL 6248499 (N.D. Cal. 2013); Friends of the
Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Environmental Services (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167 (2000) (ruling that the
standing doctrine requires injury in fact, and such injury must be concrete, particularized, and actual
or imminent).
3. In this Article, we use “privacy” to refer to information privacy.
4. See Jeffrey H. Reiman, Privacy, Intimacy, and Personhood, 6 PHIL. PUB. AFF. 26 (1976);
JOSEPH BENSMAN & ROBERT LILIENFELD, BETWEEN PUBLIC AND PRIVATE: THE LOST BOUNDARIES OF THE
SELF (1979).
5. See Julie E. Cohen, Examined Lives: Informational Privacy and the Subject as Object,
52 STAN. L. R EV. 1373 (2000); see also STANLEY BENN, PRIVACY, FREEDOM AND RESPECT FOR PERSONS,
in PRIVACY: NOMOS XIII 8 (Ronald Pennock & John Chapman eds., 1971).
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efficiency¾have tended to perceive privacy as a means of concealment,6
and argue that privacy is a source of inefficiency.7
The second approach, which is more popular in legal scholarship,
sidesteps this more elementary normative question and, taking the value
of privacy as a given, moves directly to questions of degree and manner:
to what extent should privacy be protected, and what form should these
protections take? This has often included suggesting a property right
protection over personal data.8
We aim to bridge this divide. We begin by assuming that, in addition
to privacy’s instrumental value (for example, to avoid the financial
burdens of identity theft), a diminution of privacy, which we call privacy
loss, can also create a unique type of injury, which we call privacy harm.9
Think about a friend who puts a sticker on her laptop’s webcam, a
colleague who does not use social media because he thinks it entails “too
much sharing,” or a family member who uses an end-to-end encrypted
messaging app. Putting aside the possible fear that this information
could be used against them, these decisions reflect that fact that, in the
absence of these precautions, these individuals would suffer some
disutility. This disutility is relevant for the law.
We model privacy loss in a manner that is consistent with the three
dominant conceptions of privacy: access (the law and economics
conception of privacy as concealment), control, and context. Our model
defines privacy as the standard deviation of the probability distribution
around a mean representing a person’s type¾the information that
another person wants to find out about her. In this model, when a person
attempts to learn personal information about someone else, he observes
a random draw from a distribution centered at the “true value” of that
6. See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, The Economics of Privacy, 71 AM. ECON. REV. PAPERS &
PROCEEDINGS 405 (1981).
7. An exception to this is intellectual property.
8. See, e.g., James Rule & Lawrence Hunter, Towards Property Rights in Personal Data, in
VISIONS OF PRIVACY: POLICY CHOICES FOR THE DIGITAL AGE 168 (Colin J. Bennett & Rebecca Grant eds.,
1999); LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE (1999); Jerry Kang, Information
Privacy in Cyberspace Transactions, 50 STAN. L. REV . 1193 (1998); Lawrence Lessig, The Architecture
of Privacy, 1 VAND. J. ENT. L. PRAC. 56 (1999); Patricia Mell, Seeking Shade in a Land of Perpetual
Sunlight: Privacy as Property in the Electronic Wilderness, 11 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1 (1996); Richard
S. Murphy, Property Rights in Personal Information: An Economic Defense of Privacy, 84 GEO. L.J.
2381 (1996); Paul M. Schwartz, Privacy and Democracy in Cyberspace, 52 VAND. L. REV. 1609 (1999);
Paul M. Schwartz, Property, Privacy, and Personal Data, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2056 (2004).
9. M. Ryan Calo, The Boundaries of Privacy Harm, 86 IND. L.J. 1131, 1131, 1142–55 (2011)
(separating between subjective privacy harms, which we focus on, and objective privacy harms, which
refer to other interests being harmed through the coerced or unanticipated use of someone’s
information against that person); Cf. Lisa Austin, Enough About Me: Why Privacy Is About Power,
Not Consent (or Harm), in A WORLD WITHOUT PRIVACY: WHAT LAW CAN AND SHOULD DO? 131 (Austin
Sarat ed., 2015) (arguing that privacy law should move from the paradigm of harm and consent to one
of power).
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information. After aggregating these draws with his prior, he forms a
subjective distribution, which represents his new, better-informed
beliefs. Privacy corresponds to the standard deviation of the distribution.
To this, consistent with the legal and philosophical approaches, we add
an intrinsic desire for privacy. This addition moves the model from the
realm of privacy as concealment to the realms of privacy as control and
privacy as contextual integrity.
Our model contributes to existing privacy scholarship in two ways.
Like other economic analyses, our model has the benefit of being
concrete and tractable. However, because it does not view the loss of
privacy as dichotomous, our approach can handle variations of degree:
our proposal is the first in this literature to model privacy as a continuum.
Given that privacy is not binary, privacy loss and privacy harm should
not be binary either.10 It also contributes to the law and economics of
privacy literature. While we do not diminish the argument that
individuals might value privacy because it allows them to conceal
undesirable facts about themselves, we add a second motivation to the
model: that, at least in certain contexts, individuals like privacy. This
model is the first in this literature to take intrinsic privacy preferences
into account. In this regard, our approach is closer to that employed by
most of the legal privacy scholarship.11
We then apply the model to two central areas of privacy law: the
common law privacy tort and the Fourth Amendment third party
doctrine.12 In the tort law context, our proposal helps to clarify the
existing common law doctrine by better distinguishing privacy harms
from reputational harms. By clarifying the underlying interests protected
by the privacy tort, it also suggests a need to reevaluate current
evidentiary standards and the relationship between the First
Amendment and the privacy tort.

10. Some courts have recognized that privacy does not work as a binary concept. See Sanders v.
ABC, 978 P.2d 67 (Cal. 1999) (“privacy, for purposes of the intrusion tort, is not a binary, all-or-nothing
characteristic. There are degrees and nuances to societal recognition of our expectations of privacy”).
11. Our model does not attempt to capture every nuance of privacy in the real world. Rather, our
goal is to create a model that captures the most important aspects of privacy, in order to gain insights
about how privacy is, and ought to be, handled by the legal system. Like a law school hypothetical, a
model helps to clarify fundamentals by stripping away all the surrounding brush to reveal the root of
the concept.
12. See Lisa Austin, Privacy and the Question of Technology, 22 L. & PHIL. 119, 164 (2003)
(arguing that, “we do not need to invent a new theory of privacy from the ground up in order to deal
with the threats posed by information technology. However, because technology creates privacy issues
that appear to fall outside the bounds of our traditional analysis—known and even accepted
surveillance, collection of non-intimate information, collection of information in public—we do need
to sharpen and deepen our understanding of traditional concerns regarding privacy in order to
respond to these new situations.”).
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In the Fourth Amendment context, our proposal illuminates the
inherent mistake of the discredited¾but still commonly applied¾third
party doctrine: its inability to see privacy in a non-dichotomous way.
This, we argue, mistakenly turns the Fourth Amendment’s “reasonable
expectations of privacy” test into a strict liability rule. Based on our
model, we propose a way to conceptualize the “reasonable expectation of
privacy” test by turning it into a negligence rule that is more appropriate
given the aims of the Fourth Amendment.
We develop our approach as follows. In Part I, we describe the
problem of defining privacy loss by outlining the different definitions of
privacy. In Part II, we present our model of privacy loss. We then apply
our model to the common law privacy tort in Part III. In Part IV, we
discuss the implications of our model for the Fourth Amendment third
party doctrine. The Appendix to this Article contains the mathematical
formalization of the model presented in Part II, as well as some
mathematical extensions.
I. THE PROBLEM OF PRIVACY LOSS
A. NORMATIVE CONCEPTS OF PRIVACY
Judith Jarvis Thomson famously observed that “[p]erhaps the most
striking thing about the right to privacy is that nobody seems to have any
very clear idea what it is.”13 In the forty years since she made this
observation, the literature has made little progress on this front. Helen
Nissenbaum, accordingly, has noted that “[o]ne point on which there
seems to be near-unanimous agreement is that privacy is a messy and
complex subject.”14 Robert Post has gone even further, remarking that
“[p]rivacy is a value so complex, so entangled in competing and
contradictory dimensions, so engorged with various and distinct
meanings, that I sometimes despair whether it can be usefully addressed
at all.”15
Daniel Solove, for example, has identified no less than six distinct
ways to conceptualize privacy: as (1) the right to be let alone, (2)
autonomy or the limited access to the self, (3) secrecy or concealment of
discreditable information, (4) control over one’s personal information,
(5) personhood and preservation of one’s dignity, and (6) intimacy and
the promotion of relationships.16 While this classification is widely

13. Judith Jarvis Thomson, The Right to Privacy, 4 PHIL. PUB. AFF. 295, 295 (1975).
14. HELEN NISSENBAUM, PRIVACY IN CONTEXT: TECHNOLOGY, POLICY, AND THE INTEGRITY OF SOCIAL
LIFE 67 (2010).
15. Robert C. Post, Three Concepts of Privacy, 89 GEO. L.J. 2087 (2001).
16. Daniel J. Solove, Conceptualizing Privacy, 90 CALIF. L. REV. 1087, 1099–21 (2002).
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accepted,17 it is not universal. Across these different normative
conceptions, the term “privacy” typically refers to the control of one’s
personal information, or as limiting access to such information. More
recently, scholars have begun to adopt a conception of privacy that
centers around the contextual integrity of personal information.18
The intellectual roots of the common law right to (informational)
privacy can be traced to an 1890 article by Warren and Brandeis.19 In it,
they characterize the right to privacy as the “right to be let alone,” and
demonstrate that this right, although not formally recognized under the
Common Law, was already widely acknowledged and protected.20 Unlike
prior authors, who had argued for enhancing privacy as a defense against
State intervention, Warren and Brandeis were primarily concerned with
intrusions by other private parties. Like many today, their concern about
privacy was spurred by a recent technological innovation. In their case,
this innovation was the camera, which had dramatically reduced the cost
of capturing people’s image.
Others come at privacy from a different angle, arguing instead that
privacy is a necessary tool for the promotion of individual autonomy. A
lack of privacy can lead an individual to feel (rightly or wrongly) that she
is constantly under scrutiny by others. As a result, the absence of privacy
constrains the spectrum of thoughts and behaviors that she considers
acceptable and limits her freedom to fully develop as an autonomous
person.21 Proponents of this conception of privacy focus on an
individual’s ability to limit access to her person, and argue that doing so
requires three elements: secrecy, anonymity, and solitude.22 Because
these three elements are jointly necessary and sufficient, none of them
alone can encompass privacy interests. Instead, a loss of any of them is a
privacy loss, even if the other two remain protected.23
Posner, on the other hand, famously argued that privacy is mainly a
matter of concealing undesirable facts about oneself. This concealment
can take two forms. First, an individual can hide unflattering information
about herself: information that would lower the receiver’s opinion of

17. See, e.g., Richard B. Bruyer, Privacy: A Review and Critique of the Literature, 43 ALBERTA L.
REV. 553 (2006).
18. See NISSENBAUM, supra note 14, at 69–71; see also infra, Subpart I.B.
19. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890).
20. Id. at 205.
21. See, e.g., Cohen, supra note 5, at 1377; Benn, supra note 5.
22. Reiman, supra note 4.
23. SISSELA BOK, SECRETS: ON THE ETHICS OF CONCEALMENT AND REVELATION (1989); DAVID M.
O’BRIEN, PRIVACY, LAW, AND PUBLIC POLICY (1979); Ruth Gavison, Privacy and the Limits of Law,
89 YALE L.J. 421 (1980); Edward Shils, Privacy: Its Constitution and Vicissitudes, 31 L. CONTEMP.
PROBS. 281 (1966).

F - COFONE-69.4.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

5/26/18 1:11 PM

1046

[Vol. 69:1039

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

her.24 For example, concealing the fact that one has been convicted of a
crime. An individual can also conceal information by a second, more
subtle means, by failing to correct a misunderstanding or misperception.
For example, she might prefer not to divulge a serious health problem to
an employer.25 With respect to this second type of concealment, Posner
adds that an individual might choose to reveal information selectively
without strictly lying or deceiving,26 and that individuals are always eager
to disclose facts that portray them in a positive light. In short, a fair
evaluation of Posner’s conception of privacy is that it exists mainly as a
device to deceive: to create or maintain a false impression.
In contrast, some view privacy as simply control over one’s personal
information. A refined notion of an individual’s level of privacy, they
argue, shows that privacy is not the absence of information about her in
public (as in Posner), but rather the control that she has over that
information.27 Privacy has also been defined along these lines as the
absence of undocumented personal knowledge.28
In a similar vein to those who view privacy as autonomy, the
defenders of privacy as personhood argue that privacy is central to
developing one’s own identity.29 Paul Schwartz, for example, criticizes
the paradigm of control over personal information as a view that
mistakenly takes autonomy as a given, and argues that privacy is
intrinsically linked with self-determination.30 Agreeing to terms and
conditions, for example, might technically fall within control over one’s
personal information, but could nevertheless violate one’s privacy
because the terms and conditions can contain boilerplate terms that the
user does not understand.
Finally, supporters of privacy as intimacy argue that the concept of
intimacy encompasses all the types of information that an individual

24. Richard A. Posner, The Right of Privacy, 12 GA. L. REV. 393, 394 (1978); Posner, supra note
6, at 405.
25. Posner, The Right of Privacy, at 394; Posner, supra note 6, at 405.
26. Posner, supra note 6. For example, most people present themselves differently to their
partners than they do to their employers. Rather than being considered deceitful, we generally refer to
this as acting professionally.
27. Randall P. Bezanson, The Right to Privacy Revisited: Privacy, News, and Social Change,
1890-1990, 80 CALIF. L. REV. 1133 (1992); Charles Fried, Privacy, 77 YALE L.J. 475 (1968) (“[P]rivacy
is not simply an absence of information about us in the minds of others, rather it is the control we have
over information about ourselves.”); Michael Froomkin, The Death of Privacy?, 52 STAN. L. R EV. 1461,
1464 (2000); see also ALAN WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM (1967).
28. W.A. Parent, A New Definition of Privacy for the Law, 2 L. PHIL. 305 (1983); William Parent,
Privacy, Morality, and the Law, 12 PHIL. PUB. AFF . 269 (1983).
29. Reiman, supra note 4; BENSMAN & LILIENFELD, supra note 4.
30. Schwartz, supra note 8. Schwartz, for example, criticizes the paradigm of control over
personal information as a liberal view that mistakenly takes autonomy as a given, and argues that
privacy is intrinsically linked with self-determination.
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would rather keep private. They see privacy is a tool to protect the
individual from being subject to misrepresentations that could occur
when others know some pieces of information about her out of context,
which could lead to misunderstandings.31 The right to privacy defines
information territories: places where it is socially acceptable to keep or
to disclose information, and which define the boundaries of private life
and social life.32
B. DESCRIPTIVE CONCEPTS OF PRIVACY
While some authors’ conceptualizations of privacy fit neatly into one
of the six categories, others do not.33 This is because the conceptions of
privacy discussed above are not mutually exclusive. For example, while
some focus on the ultimate goals of privacy, others are more concerned
with how it is protected. Control over personal information, for example,
can be seen as derivative of the limited access to the self. Limited access
to the self, in turn, is in many ways similar to the right to be let alone, and
the creation of the self seems like a combination of the two. What they all
have in common is that they conceptualize privacy by looking for a
necessary and sufficient set of elements and, in such way, find its
“essence.”34
The normative approach leads to two difficulties. First, it ignores the
basic intuition that “privacy” depends on both facts (including cultural,
historical and technological facts) and context, not only on some
essential characteristic.35 Second, many of the concepts that are used to
define privacy are themselves hard to pin down. While these can be useful
31. Robert S. Gerstein, Intimacy and Privacy, 89 ETHICS 76 (1978); James Rachels, Why Privacy
Is Important, 4 PHIL. PUB. AFF. 323 (1975); JULIE C. INNESS, PRIVACY, INTIMACY, AND ISOLATION (1992).
32. Robert C. Post, The Social Foundations of Privacy: Community and Self in the Common Law
Tort, 77 CALIF. L. REV. 957 (1989).
33. For example, some conceptualizations of privacy seem to fit into more than one category. At
the same time, others, such as Nissenbaum’s privacy as context, do not fit naturally into any of them.
See Helen Nissenbaum, Privacy as Contextual Integrity, 79 WASH. L. REV. 119 (2004); see also Adam
Barth et al., Privacy and Contextual Integrity: Framework and Applications, in 2006 IEEE
SYMPOSIUM ON SECURITY AND PRIVACY (2006), http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/lpdocs/epic03/wrapper
.htm?arnumber=1624011.
34. Solove, supra note 16, at 1096 (noting that all approaches fail for being both under and over
inclusive, and abandoning the search for a definition of privacy); see also NISSENBAUM, supra note 14,
at 68:
[S]ome authors have argued that confusion over the concept of privacy arises from a failure
to recognize the difference between descriptive or neutral conceptions and normative ones.
To provide a neutral conception is to state what privacy is without incorporating into its
meaning that privacy is a good things, worth having, and deserving moral and legal
protection . . . One of the benefits of starting with a neutral conception of privacy is that it
allows one to talk about states of increased and decreased privacy without begging the
normative question of whether these traits are good or bad.
35. NISSENBAUM, supra note 14.
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for linking privacy breaches to situations that people intuitively consider
wrongful,36 their primary contribution is not to provide a sharp
boundary. For example, autonomy and personhood have many facets
and are no easier to define than privacy itself. Someone suffering from a
privacy violation might complain that such violation injures her
personhood or autonomy, but this statement does little to pin down the
circumstances under which an individual loses privacy.37 These
difficulties are so acute that Post has argued that it is extremely difficult,
if not impossible, to succeed in this endeavor of defining the right to
privacy’s essence.38
In contrast to the six normative conceptions of privacy, we can think
of three descriptive conceptions of privacy: limiting access to personal
information, control over information, and appropriate information
flows.39 Because these views aim to identify when privacy is diminished,
rather than when privacy rights are breached, they relate more closely to
identifying harms to privacy. The discussion above makes clear that one
way to interpret the perspective of those who advocate for privacy as the
right to be let alone or for privacy as secrecy is that they operate under a
logic of access, while we can see most of the proponents of privacy as
autonomy or as control as operating under the logic of control, and most
of those who view privacy as personhood and intimacy doing so based on
a logic of information flows. As we discuss in more detail below,40 our
model can be interpreted in light of any of these three descriptive
conceptions of privacy.
Rather than aiming to define privacy, we offer a functional model of
privacy that is designed for legal analysis.41 While our proposal is
compatible with these previous approaches, our goal is to develop a
model that is both simple to apply and useful for legal analysis. As Ryan
Calo has said, “describing the outer boundaries and core properties of
privacy harm helps to reveal values, identify and address new problems,

36. James Q. Whitman, The Two Western Cultures of Privacy: Dignity Versus Liberty, 113 YALE
L.J. 1151 (2004).
37. Id.
38. Post, supra note 15.
39. NISSENBAUM, supra note 14, at 67–126.
40. See Subpart II.B.
41. Cf. NISSENBAUM, supra note 14, at 68:
[O]ne of the benefits of starting with a neutral conception of privacy is that it allows one to
talk about states of increased and decreased privacy without begging the normative
question of whether these states are good or bad. It leaves open the possibility that in certain
circumstances less privacy might be better than more and that reductions in privacy need
not constitute violations.

F - COFONE-69.4.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

May 2018]

5/26/18 1:11 PM

PRIVACY HARMS

1049

and guard against dilution.”42 In the following Part, we aim to describe
such boundaries.43 We do so with a model that captures the idea that
information privacy is about people’s ability to deduce our personal
information, which underlies each of the three descriptive approaches to
privacy discussed above.44
II. THE PRIVACY BELL
We model an individual’s level of privacy with respect to how certain
an outsider is about fundamental aspects of that individual. The more
certain the outsider is about the individual’s attributes, the less privacy
the individual has with respect to him. As a result, such an increase in the
outsider’s certainty corresponds to a privacy loss to the individual.
We formalize this concept in a tractable model. We then take this
model of privacy loss and apply it to contexts in which the law protects
privacy. Since the law typically does so in contexts where individuals like
privacy, we embed our model of privacy loss into a setting where, other
things equal, an individual prefers more privacy to less.45 By combining
these two building blocks, our model can be applied to a wide variety of
legal contexts. We illustrate the value of this formalization below,46
where we apply it to central issues in privacy law and show how the
formalization presented here provides new insights to doctrinal debates.
A. PRIVACY LOSS
Consider an individual named Abby. Abby has a fundamental
characteristic. This might be her willingness to pay for a good, her wealth,
her desirability as an employee, or her intrinsic worth as human being.
We will refer to this as her “type.” Initially, only Abby knows her type.
For the purposes of this example, we will suppose that Abby’s type
represents her desirability as an employee.
Now consider Ben. Ben is considering hiring Abby, and would like
to know how desirable Abby is as an employee. Ben cannot observe
42. See Calo, supra note 9, at 1142; see also Ryan Calo, Privacy Harm Exceptionalism, 12 COLO.
TECH. L.J. 361 (2014).
43. See Tom Gerety, Redefining Privacy, 12 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 233, 234 (1977) (arguing that
privacy will be important and worthy of protection only when its concept is more clearly delineated,
and stating that “a legal concept [of privacy] will do us little good if it expands like a gas to fill up the
available space”).
44. See NISSENBAUM, supra note 14, at 68 (“[T]hose, like Gavison, who propose a neutral
conception do not deny the possibility of normative accounts of privacy.”).
45. In the mathematical appendix, we also consider the standard setting in which individuals have
utility that is increasing and concave in privacy. In other words, we assume that she likes privacy, and
values an incremental amount of privacy more when she has little of it left than she does when she has
a lot of it.
46. See infra Parts III, and IV.
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Abby’s type directly. However, Ben does have a fairly good idea about
what the overall population of workers in the community looks like. He
knows, for example, how productive the average worker is. He also knows
the general shape of the distribution¾for example, whether workers are
evenly spread out across different types, or whether they tend to be
bunched together with only a few outliers.
Ben can also observe signals, or clues, that allow him to guess
something about Abby’s type. For example, while he may not know
exactly how desirable she is as an employee (her “type”), he may be able
to learn where she went to college, how many jobs she has had in the last
year, and whether she has ever been convicted of a felony. None of these
signals fully reveal Abby’s type (her desirability as an employee) on their
own. They do, however, allow Ben to form a clearer picture about it.
Specifically, when he aggregates these signals, Ben can form his best
guess about Abby’s type. Because he knows that this is only an informed
guess, he still has some uncertainty about her type¾he might guess too
high or too low. The more uncertain Ben is about Abby’s type, the more
privacy she has.

Figure 1: The Privacy Bell: Abby’s privacy is higher when the
distribution has fatter tails.
Figure 1 illustrates this intuition. When Ben has few signals about
Abby’s type (𝜎=3, the blue curve), he knows that there is a wide range of
types that are plausible. As he gets to know Abby better (moving from the
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blue curve to the green curve, 𝜎=2), the distribution becomes narrower,
meaning that the range of plausible types narrows. As he gets to know
Abby better still (moving to the red curve, 𝜎=1) Ben has a good idea about
what he wants to know about Abby: the odds that Abby’s type is way out
in either tail diminishes dramatically, and there is a narrower range of
plausible (or likely) values.47
In the figure above, we assume that each signal is drawn from the
same distribution. We would expect that, most of the time, the first signal
to have the greatest effect on Ben’s posterior. This makes intuitive
sense¾just like a first impression, the first thing Ben learns about Abby
is likely to have a big impact on his beliefs.48
While we leave the formalization of our model to the Appendix,49 the
intuition behind the model is simple. As Ben learns things about Abby,
he gets a better sense of who she is. When he does so, Abby loses some
privacy. Each time Ben observes another signal about Abby, he becomes
more certain about her type. Every increase in his certainty results in an
equivalent privacy loss to Abby. Mathematically, Ben’s certainty
increases because the standard deviation of his Bayesian posterior falls.
Because this incremental increase in Ben’s certainty and loss of Abby’s
privacy are two sides of the same coin, it is natural to model privacy loss
as the reduction in the standard deviation of Ben’s posterior (the Bell
curve illustrated in Figure 1).50
In the real world, not every piece of information is created equally.
For example, in the context of Abby’s health, learning that she had a mild
cold last winter is not the same thing as learning the detail of her family’s
medical history. This can be captured in our model by allowing different

47. We use the term “plausible” loosely. Strictly speaking, in the example illustrated in Figure 1,
all values along the x-axis remain possible, even for the red curve. The difference between the curves
is that the likelihood of a value far from the center of the distribution is lower under the red curve than
it is for the blue one. Because the likelihood of such a value is very low, we can think of these values as
being implausible, even if they are possible.
48. But see infra notes 51–52.
49. See infra Part V.
50. In addition to observing signals¾which convey a fact¾it is possible for a fact to be “common
knowledge.” Formally, if a fact is “common knowledge” among a group of people, it does not only mean
that everyone knows the fact. It also means that everyone knows that everyone knows the fact, and
that everyone knows that everyone knows that everyone knows it, and so on ad infinitum. See, e.g.,
DREW FUDENBERG & JEAN TIROLE, GAME THEORY 4 (1991). Our model does not distinguish between
signals that everyone has observed and signals that are common knowledge in this formal sense. While
we would interpret both situations as involving the same level of privacy, they may have different
implications for the individual whose privacy is implicated, since the two situations might lead
observers to act in different ways. In other words, while common knowledge does not affect Abby’s
level of privacy directly, it might change how Ben acts in the face of knowledge about Abby.
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signals to have different amounts of informativeness, as there is nothing
in the model that requires each fact to be treated equally.51
A common example in the privacy literature is the naked body.52 To
build on this familiar example, suppose Douglas and Evan are playing
strip poker. Because Douglas is a much better poker player than Evan,
Evan is repeatedly required to remove articles of clothing. Each article he
removes can be interpreted as sending a signal to Douglas about what his
naked body looks like. If the first article Evan removes is a sock, this is
not very informative¾Douglas learns very little from observing Evan’s
bare foot. Eventually, Evan removes his sweater, which send a stronger
signal to Douglas. However, if Evan had previously forgotten about his
watch, and removes it next, this signal would not be very informative. If
the game continues, and at some point Evan removes his shirt, this would
send a very strong signal to Douglas. In this example, each signal carries
a different amount of information. Moreover, the informativeness of each
signal depends on the prior signals that Douglas has received (for
example, removing his right sock than it would be if he had not already
done so).53
For the purposes of the model, we assume that an individual’s type
can be summarized by a point on some unidimensional interval I (the
x-axis in Figure 1). This restriction is an expositional convenience.54 This
does not imply that type summarizes only one category of information.
Just as the price of a car summarizes a host of factors about the vehicle
itself, as well as factors related to the local market and, in certain cases,
the buyer, an individual’s type can be interpreted as a summary of all
relevant information about her for the purposes for which the acquirer
gathers her information.
In our model, privacy exists on a continuum, meaning that Abby’s
level of privacy can increase or decrease, and can increase or decrease by
varying amounts. We believe that this represents an improvement over a
dichotomous model in which people just “have” or “do not have” privacy

51. Indeed, some signals might have no informativeness at all, just as some facts might be
completely useless in answering a particular question. These signals would have no effect on Ben’s
posterior. It is also possible that Ben could learn things that are contradictory, which could actually
lead him to become less certain about Abby. While that is true¾both intuitively and in the
mathematical formalization¾we focus in the more common situation in which more information
leads to a clearer picture. This corresponds to a situation in which more signals lead to a tighter
posterior distribution.
52. See, e.g., Yofi Tirosh & Michael Birnhack, Naked in Front of the Machine: Does Airport
Scanning Violate Privacy?, 74 OHIO STATE L.J. 1263, 1265 (2013).
53. We explore some of the implications of aggregating signals in the context of ISPs in a
companion paper. See Ignacio N. Cofone & Adriana Z. Robertson, Consumer Privacy in a Behavioral
World, 69 HASTINGS L.J. (forthcoming Aug. 2018).
54. We relax this assumption in the Appendix, Subpart B.3.
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for two reasons. First, we believe that it better captures the basic
intuitions of privacy. Informational privacy is not only about having
privacy or not. When Ben learns a fact about Abby, it is not that Abby no
longer has any privacy, nor is it true that before that, she had “full”
privacy. Instead, informational privacy is really about levels of privacy.
When Ben learns about a fact about Abby, her level of privacy falls. He
doesn’t know all the facts about her, and it would be absurd to say that
she no longer has any privacy. But nor is it correct to say that nothing
has happened with respect to her privacy. Instead, it is most appropriate
to simply say that her level of privacy has declined.
Second, the continuous nature of privacy in our model allows it to
better capture the tradeoffs associated with privacy and privacy law.
Whereas dichotomous conceptions allow only for two possible outcomes,
“privacy breach” and “no privacy breach,” our model is better suited for
“grey areas” where careful and rigorous analyses are most useful and
needed. We discuss some such grey areas below in Parts III and IV.
B. PREFERENCES OVER PRIVACY
1. People May Desire Privacy
The second building block deals with how Abby feels about this
privacy loss. In other words, we define Abby’s preferences over privacy.
Because our primary goal is to apply our model to contexts in which the
law engages with informational privacy, we will use it in contexts where
Abby likes privacy.55
What does this model imply about the reasons for which people
desire privacy? First, as discussed above, the model captures the idea that
individuals have an intrinsic desire for privacy; It’s that people also desire

55. We model this preference in the most standard way possible. We assume that individuals like
privacy in most contexts and, all other things equal, they like more privacy better. This is not to say
that there are no other settings in which an individual might feel differently. Indeed, it does not take
a psychologist to know that in some settings, individuals like to share details about themselves with
third parties. For example, Abby might enjoy sharing details about her day with her spouse or friend,
and it might make her happy to know that her loved ones have a very clear sense of her type (such as,
that they know her very well). While we recognize that these settings are important, they are not the
types of settings in which the law engages with informational privacy, and are therefore not the
primary focus on this Article. Even in such settings, however, the first part of our model¾the model
definition of privacy loss¾is still valid, and can provide a useful framework for formal analysis. This
is also not to say that individuals never value privacy for instrumental reasons. Just as a person might
want to eat apples both because they taste good and because they are good for one’s health, a person
might want to maintain privacy both for intrinsic and instrumental reasons.
In the mathematical formalization in the Appendix, we add the very standard assumption that, like
most good things in life, privacy has diminishing returns. Abby will mind it less that Ben finds out a
little about her when Ben knows almost nothing about her, than she will when Ben has already found
out a lot about her. Figure 2, in the Appendix, illustrates an example of such a utility function.
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privacy for its own sake.56 This is not to say, however, that they cannot
also desire privacy for instrumental reasons. For example, in addition to
valuing privacy for its own sake, Abby might value privacy because it
allows her to conceal unflattering facts about herself, or because it
protects her from suffering financial harm. In this sense, this model is
not inconsistent with the economic conception of privacy.57 Rather, this
conception can be captured within the model by setting the marginal
utility of privacy to zero for all levels of privacy.
Second, while this conception of privacy is intrinsic¾in the sense
that individuals desire privacy for its own sake¾it captures the fact that
individuals can, and do, trade (or sell) their privacy for other goods or
services.58 Abby will face a privacy loss when she shares information, but
her overall utility might still increase given the benefits that she obtained
due to sharing it. Abby’s utility will also depend on how Ben uses her
information, but those harms are best conceptualized not as privacy
losses, but as other losses that were enabled due to a loss in
privacy59¾what Calo has called extrinsic privacy harms.60 Moreover,
because it conceives of privacy along a continuum rather than as a
dichotomy, as discussed above, we can also model individual preferences
over privacy as a continuum. This captures the idea that giving up a small
amount of privacy is different from a large privacy loss.
In principle, the tighter Ben’s posterior distribution, the less privacy
Abby will have and, all else equal, the less utility she will have.61 That said,
56. Calo, supra note 9 (internal quotation marks omitted) (explaining that:
[P]rivacy harms fall into two categories. The first category is ‘subjective’ in the sense of being
internal to the person harmed. Subjective privacy harms are those that flow from the
perception of unwanted observation. Subjective privacy harms can be acute or ongoing, and
can accrue to one individual or to many. They can range in severity from mild discomfort at
the presence of a security camera to mental pain and distress far greater than could be
inflicted by mere bodily injury.).
57. See supra INTRODUCTION.
58. But see Katherine J. Strandburg, Free Fall: The Online Market’s Consumer Preference
Disconnect, 2013 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 95 (2013) (arguing that it is misleading to say that internet users
“pay” for goods and services with their data because there is no functioning market for personal
information exchanges).
59. Of course, if Ben sells or gives information to other parties, these would also be privacy losses.
We address this in Part III.A, infra.
60. Calo, supra note 9, at 1143:
Objective privacy harm is the actual adverse consequence¾the theft of identity itself or the
formation of a negative opinion¾that flows from the loss of control over information or
sensory access. Subjective privacy harm is, by and large, the perception of loss of control
that results in fear or discomfort.
61. Of course, Abby’s disutility also depends on who Ben is to Abby. Abby might experience a
negligible utility loss from her partner learning something about her. Indeed, as explained infra, this
might even lead to a utility gain. On the other hand, she may experience a significant utility loss if the
same fact became known to a stranger in the street.
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there will be situations in which privacy loss will be more complex. In
many situations, Abby’s marginal utility of regarding privacy will be flat,
rather than increasing. Those who believe the “I have nothing to hide”
argument claim to have no privacy disutility from affirmatively sharing
information with others. This might be the case. If so, they might even
pursue sharing information, with a consequential privacy loss, because
they suffer no harm from the loss of privacy, while the act of sharing
brings them benefits¾which can range from material benefits to gains in
intimacy or agency.62 In other words, they are able to selectively reveal
information. We view these not as privacy gains, but rather as extrinsic
privacy gains that accrue as a consequence of a reduction in privacy.
Moreover, depending on the one’s conception of privacy, one will
have a different reading of this model. A proponent of the privacy as
secrecy or control approach might interpret a privacy loss as the
reduction in the probability distribution, independent of the subject’s
utility. When Ben learns more about Abby, she has less secrecy and less
control over her information, even if she is not unhappy about this loss.
Alternatively, a proponent of the privacy as contextual integrity
approach63 might focus on the reduction in marginal utility, because it is
this reduction that indicates that, given the context, her information
flowed in a socially inappropriate manner. If Ben learns more about Abby
and she does not mind it, this implies that Ben learned the information
through a socially appropriate channel.
2. Preferences over Privacy vs. Preferences over Signals
It is worth noting the distinction between Abby’s preferences over
privacy (such as, the standard deviation of Ben’s posterior) and her
preferences over information. In our model, Abby cares about the latter
only to the extent that it affects the former.
This is the case with respect to both the level of her utility and to the
function’s shape. For example, while Abby’s utility over privacy may be
concave (implying that she values privacy more when she has very little
of it), her utility over information may not be. This is because the more
Ben already knows about Abby, the less effect any particular signal will
have on the standard deviation of his Bayesian posterior.
As a result, while the first few signals affect the standard deviation
a lot, Abby’s preferences are such that a reduction in standard deviation
from a high starting point has a relatively small effect on her utility. This

62. See supra note 45.
63. See NISSENBAUM, supra note 14.
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is because, at that high starting point, she already has a lot of privacy, so
losing a little might not be painful to her.
To see how this works, consider Bill Cosby. According to an article
in The Guardian, by December 31, 2015, Cosby had been accused of
sexual abuse, harassment and/or attempted abuse by 57 different
women.64 While the first allegation was reportedly made to the police in
March 2000, victims’ stories did not receive widespread media attention
until Joan Tarshish’s interview on CNN.65 This allegation opened the
floodgates, and by the end of November, 14 more women came forward.
The media attention around Cosby was intense,66 and the episode
prompted substantial amounts of soul searching.67 A man who was once
beloved as “America’s Dad”68 has now become the butt of the jokes of one
of his onetime admirers.69 We can think of these allegations as signals.
While the first few allegations made a huge impact on the way people saw
Cosby, it is fair to say that as the number of accusers continued to swell,
the marginal effect of each additional accusation began to shrink. Once
ten women had accused Cosby of assault, the eleventh allegation, on its
own, is unlikely to have much of an effect of an observer’s posterior. This
is not to say that a trial is unnecessary, only that the effect of an additional
allegation, without more, is likely to be smaller.
C. PRIVACY VERSUS REPUTATION
So far, we have been assuming that Ben had, on average, the right
idea about Abby. In other words, we have been assuming that the mean
of his prior distribution was equal to the true mean. Moreover, thus far,
we have been assuming that when Ben observes signals about Abby,
those signals are themselves unbiased¾and that they are, on average,
correct. As a result, when Ben observes additional signals about Abby,
their primary effect on his posterior is on its standard deviation. Indeed,
on average, they have no effect on the mean of his posterior.

64. Amanda Holpuch, Jessica Glenza & Nicky Woolf, The Bill Cosby Sexual Abuse Claims¾ 57
Women and the Dates They Went Public, GUARDIAN (Dec. 31, 2015, 1:03 PM), https://www.theguard
ian.com/world/2015/dec/31/bill-cosby-sexual-abuse-claims-57-women-dates-public-accusations.
65. Interview with Joah Tarshish with CNN (Nov. 18, 2014, 5:01 PM), https://www.cnn.com/
2014/11/17/showbiz/bill-cosby-new-accuser-allegation/index.html (last visited Apr. 21, 2018).
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Tim Walker, Bill Cosby: The Rise and Fall of ‘America's Dad’, INDEPENDENT (Dec. 30, 2015,
8:15 PM), http://www.independent.co.uk/news/people/bill-cosby-the-rise-and-fall-of-america-sdad-a6791381.html.
69. Mallory Carra, Dave Chappelle's Bill Cosby Jokes from 'The Age of Spin' Are Brutally Honest
About How Former Fans Feel, BUSTLE (Mar. 22, 2017), https://www.bustle.com/p/dave-chappellesbill-cosby-jokes-from-the-age-of-spin-are-brutally-honest-about-how-former-fans-feel-45800.
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Not all information has this attribute. Of particular interest in the
privacy context is what we might call “left field” information
¾information about Abby that Ben never even thought to think about.
For example, consider the allegation that the former UK Prime Minister
David Cameron engaged in bestiality while at university.70 To most
people, this allegation came out of left field¾it seems safe to say that the
average person had never given any thought to the possibility that
Cameron may or may not have engaged in bestiality. Had Angela, one
such person, been asked about it, she would likely have answered that the
odds of him having done so were infinitesimally small.
The publication of the allegation was a signal about Cameron. While
Angela might not have known for certainty whether the allegation was
true, we can interpret the allegation as increasing her subjective
probability that Cameron had engaged in bestiality. The signal actually
made Angela less confident about Cameron’s type¾whereas before she
was almost certain that Cameron had not engaged in bestiality, now she
is less certain. As a result, to the extent that his engagement is bestiality
is relevant to Angela’s evaluation of Cameron’s type, this would in turn
make Angela more uncertain. The standard deviation of her posterior
would therefore increase, not decrease. In the context of our model, this
implies that Cameron has more privacy, not less.
While this may seem problematic, it actually points to a deeper
insight captured by the model: the relationship between reputation and
privacy.71 In addition to causing her posterior to widen, to the extent that
Angela thinks that bestiality is an undesirable attribute, this increased
probability would cause Angela’s subjective posterior distribution of
Cameron’s type to shift to the left. This is the equivalent of a reputational
hit to Cameron. We will come back to this distinction below, where we
discuss the application of the model to tort law.72
The key point is that the allegation of bestiality resulted in Angela
becoming less confident about Cameron¾the standard deviation of her
posterior is wider. As a result, from Angela’s perspective, she knows less
about Cameron then she did before, even though she has observed an
additional signal about him. This is the case even if the allegation is true.

70. Nadia Khomami, David Cameron, a Pig’s Head and a Secret Society at Oxford
University¾Explained, GUARDIAN (Sept. 21, 2015, 9:29 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/
politics/2015/sep/21/david-cameron-piers-gaveston-society-what-we-know-oxford-secret.
71. See Andrew F. Daughety & Jennifer F. Reinganum, Public Goods, Social Pressure, and the
Choice between Privacy and Publicity, 2 AM. ECON. J.: MICROECONOMICS 191, 191 (2010) (introducing
a model where individuals suffer reputational harm from the loss of privacy, so privacy protection
allows them to engage in an optimal level of activity).
72. See infra Part III.
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This example also illustrates how, under certain circumstances, a
person might experience a utility gain from a reduction privacy. Suppose
that the allegations about Cameron’s bestiality were false. Once the
(false) allegations are made public, Cameron’s best strategy might be to
quickly reveal his non-bestiality type to the world. While he would suffer
a privacy loss by doing so, the reputational benefit that he experiences
would more than make up for it. He would therefore be happy to have a
tighter Bayesian posterior.
In the next Part, we apply this model to the first of two areas of
law¾the privacy tort. In doing so, we further draw out the distinction
between a privacy interest and a reputational interest. These two
interests, while related, are also distinct.
III. TORT LAW DOCTRINAL CONSEQUENCES
A. PRIVACY’S TWO PROTECTED INTERESTS
The common law privacy tort has four facets: (1) appropriation of
one’s name, image or likeness (“appropriation”); (2) false light; (3)
intrusion upon seclusion (“intrusion”); and (4) public disclosure of
private facts. The first of these, appropriation, allows an individual to
prevent the use of her name and picture for commercial purposes
(including advertising) without her consent. False light is implicated
when a third party uses true facts to create a false impression. Intrusion
upon seclusion gives an individual the right to prevent third parties from
obtaining information about her by intrusive means. Finally, public
disclosure of private facts allows her to prevent the publication by a third
party of intimate facts about herself.
While the term privacy typically involves the control of, limited
access to, or contextual integrity of personal information,73 the privacy
tort has long been known to defend wider interests. Post has noted that
privacy attempts to safeguard minimal rules of civility, protecting the
identity of individuals in a community.74 As he put it, “the common law
torts of defamation and invasion of privacy represent just such efforts to
use law to subject communication to ‘universal’ cultural standards.”75
“[I]ntentional infliction of emotional distress is one of a family of actions,
which include defamation and invasion of privacy, that are designed to
73. Solove, supra note 16; NISSENBAUM, supra note 14.
74. Post, supra note 32, at 959–86.
75. Robert C. Post, The Constitutional Concept of Public Discourse: Outrageous Opinion,
Democratic Deliberation, and Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 103 HARV. L. REV. 601, 634 (1990)
[hereinafter Post, Constitutional Concept]; see also Robert C. Post, The Social Foundations of
Defamation Law: Reputation and the Constitution, 74 CALIF. L. REV. 691, 714–15 (1986) [hereinafter
Post, Social Foundations].
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protect the respect to which the law believes persons are entitled.”76 In
fact, invasion of privacy has been explicitly described by the Supreme
Court as a remedy for injuries “to plaintiff’s emotions and . . . mental
suffering.”77 This idea is also present in both Womack and in the Second
Restatement of Torts, which characterize privacy, defamation and
intentional infliction of emotional distress as serving two aims: the
reparation of harm caused by uncivil behavior and the protection of
“generally accepted standards of decency and morality that define for us
the meaning of life in a ‘civilized community.’”78
As Austin has also noted, the privacy torts protect more than just
privacy.79
Indeed, under our model of privacy, only two of the four privacy
torts truly protect privacy interests. To see this, suppose that Abby
interviews for a job with Ben If Ben broke into Abby’s home (intrusion
upon seclusion), he would obtain new signals about Abby. These new
signals would reduce the standard deviation of his posterior distribution
of Abby’s type. He could find, for example, a family picture indicating
that she is caring, or a pile of dirty clothes indicating that she is untidy.
This represents a loss of privacy¾Ben’s Bayesian posterior is tighter.
Similarly, imagine that Ben told Caroline private facts about Abby’s
lifestyle, something that would be actionable as a public disclosure of
private facts. Our model would interpret these facts as signals about
Abby. By passing these signals to Caroline, Ben is allowing Caroline to
reduce the standard deviation of her posterior about Abby. Here again,
Abby suffers a privacy loss.
However, Abby’s privacy loss is to Caroline rather than to Ben. Ben’s
posterior remains unchanged, since the act of disclosing private facts to
Caroline did not cause him to learn anything new about Abby. Under the
privacy tort, however, Abby’s claim is against Ben, not Caroline. This is
as it should be. While the loss of privacy is to Caroline, it is Ben that
caused Abby’s loss. It is therefore appropriate for him to be the party to
compensate Abby. In other words, the difference between an intrusion
tort and a public disclosure tort is whose bell curve is narrowed by the

76. Post, Constitutional Concept, supra note 75, at 616; see also Post, supra note 32, at 959–66.
77. Froelich v. Adair, 516 P.2d 993, 996 (Kan. 1973); see also Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 384
n.9 (1967); Post, Constitutional Concept, supra note 75, at 615.
78. Post, Constitutional Concept, supra note 75, at 624 (citing Womack and the RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS) (quotation marks omitted).
79. See Austin, supra note 12, at 165–66 (arguing that many emerging issues related to
information misuse, such as concern for the accuracy of information, “are not best described as privacy
issues” and that “[t]he response to this, on my view, should not be to expand our idea of privacy to the
conceptual breaking point but to clarify the many different types of interests that may be at stake in
the emerging contexts of information collection, use, and disclosure.”).
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information. Under an intrusion tort, the perpetrator (Ben) finds
reduced his probability curve of his beliefs about the target person
(Abby). Under a disclosure tort, the perpetrator narrows the probability
curve of a third party.
On the other hand, it is not clear how Ben’s depiction of Abby to
Caroline under a false light affects Abby’s privacy. In our model, false
light can be understood as Ben providing Caroline false signals about
Abby. While the facts in a false light claim are themselves true, they are
conveyed in such a way as to give false impression. Whether the facts
themselves are true is, from Abby’s perspective, irrelevant, because it is
how they are understood by Caroline that matters. This allows us to
abstract away from the facts themselves to focus on the harm that false
light causes Abby. We can therefore interpret the tortious facts as false
signals.
Upon receiving these false signals, Caroline’s posterior about Abby
will not necessarily become tighter. In fact, if the false signals are very
different from Caroline’s prior beliefs about Abby, they may cause her to
rethink what she knows about Abby.80 Our model captures these doubts
as a widening of Caroline’s posterior. In addition to widening her
posterior, the misleading information might shift the mean of her
posterior distribution. If we take the x-axis in Figure 1 to represent
quality, false light might simply move the whole distribution to the left.
This would cause a reputational harm to Abby, rather than a privacy
harm.81
Finally, suppose that Caroline appropriated Abby’s image and used
it to advertise her company. What affect does this have on Abby’s
privacy? Upon seeing this advertisement, Dennis might reasonably
interpret it as a signal that Abby is associated with Caroline’s company or
product. Of course, the fact that the image was appropriated implies that
this signal is false. The fact that there may be nothing particularly
damaging or embarrassing per se is irrelevant. The false signals that
Dennis observes as a result of the (false) association generated by
Caroline’s appropriation of Abby’s image still affect Dennis’s posterior
distribution about Abby. In particular, the most likely result of these false
signals is that Dennis’s posterior will become wider. Unlike false light,
where the false signal would most likely lead to a downward shift is the
mean of the posterior, with appropriation, Dennis’s posterior could shift
up or down.

80. This situation is similar to the example of the allegations of bestiality against David Cameron,
discussed above. See supra Subpart II.C.
81. See supra Subpart II.C.
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The privacy tort, in other words, protects not one, but two distinct
interests: a true privacy interest, which is to protect certain aspects of
ourselves from other’s eyes,82 and a reputational interest, which is
concerned about one’s personal image in one’s community. Only the first
of these, which encompasses intrusion upon seclusion and public
disclosure of private facts, is a privacy interest. The second pair,
appropriation and false light, relate to one’s reputation. While distinct
from each other, intrusion and public disclosure are both based on the
idea that increasing the precision of a third party’s knowledge of one’s
type¾whether that third party is the tortfeasor¾constitutes harm. For
appropriation and false light, the harm is less about the standard
deviation than it is about the mean of that distribution. In other words,
the harm comes from sending misleading signals to a third party.
Therefore, while all four privacy torts center around “information
about the victim,” only intrusion and public disclosure refer directly to
“the victim’s information.” This is not to say that the other two are
unfounded or inappropriate. Protecting these interests through privacy
law may be the most effective, and even the most coherent, method
available. However, by helping to clarify the interests in play, this model
can help judges determine appropriate remedies.83
B. AN APPLICATION TO PRIVACY’S CASE LAW
To illustrate how privacy rules are an effective means of protecting
both true privacy interests and reputational interests, we turn our
attention to an examination of some landmark common law privacy
cases, frequently appearing in privacy law casebooks.84 Table 1, below,
shows the interests at hand in each case, according to the disputed claim.

82. Defining privacy is more complicated than this statement suggests. See supra Part I.
83. Other torts that are related to privacy but not part of the privacy tort are also about
“information about the victim.” Libel and slander are the most obvious of these. Indeed, under our
model, libel and slander would be conceptualized in much the same way as false light. Insofar as Ben
intended the reduction in Abby’s privacy to cause her harm, it could be related to intentional infliction
of emotional distress.
84. See, e.g., DANIEL J. SOLOVE & PAUL M. SCHWARTZ, PRIVACY, LAW ENFORCEMENT, AND NATIONAL
SECURITY (2014).

F - COFONE-69.4.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

5/26/18 1:11 PM

1062

[Vol. 69:1039

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

Claim

Outcome

Interest

Paveisch v. NE Life
Insurance Co. (1903)
Sidis v. F-R Publishing
(1940)
Time v. Hill (1967)

Appropriation
[+Defamation]
PDPF

Won appropriation

Reputation

Lost PDPF

Privacy

False light

Lost false light

Reputation

Nader v. GM (1970)

Intrusion [+IIED]

Won intrusion

Privacy

Dietermann v. Time
(1971)
Neff v. Time (1976)

Intrusion

Won intrusion

Privacy

PDPF, Appropriation

Lost PDPF
Lost appropriation
Lost appropriation

Both

Hustler v. Falwell
(1988)
Schulman v. GWP
(1998)
Steinbuch v. Cutler
(2008)

Appropriation
[+Defamation and
IIED]
PDPF, Intrusion
PDPF, False light
[+IIED]

Lost PDPF
Won intrusion
(only calls for
discovery)

Reputation

Privacy
Both

Table 1. Common law landmark privacy cases according to their protected interests

There are two reasons why an examination of the landmark privacy
cases is consistent with our argument that the privacy tort protects two
distinct interests. First, as Table 1 reveals, while both interests are
reflected in these cases, each case is chiefly about only one of these
interests. While this is not dispositive, it supports the view that the four
privacy torts can be sensibly divided into two categories along the lines
that we have proposed.
Of the nine cases chosen, only two engage both interests. In Neff
v. Time the plaintiff claimed public disclosure of private facts and
appropriation.85 In Steinbuch v. Cutler, plaintiff claimed public
disclosure of private facts and false light (and intentional infliction of
emotional distress).86 In both cases, the plaintiff’s primary claim engaged
a reputational interest, with an additional claim of public disclosure of
private facts to cover the facts that were appropriated and framed under
a false light, respectively.
Four of the remaining cases engaged a true privacy interest. In
Nader v. General Motors,87 and Dietemann v. Time, Inc.88 the plaintiff
claimed intrusion, and in Sidis v. F-R publishing the claim was public

85.
86.
87.
88.

Neff v. Time, Inc., 406 F. Supp 858, 861 (W.D. Pa. 1976).
Steinbuch v. Cutler, 518 F.3d 580, 583 (8th Cir. 2008).
Nader v. General Motors Corp., 255 N.E.2d 765, 767 (N.Y. 1970).
Dietemann v. Time, Inc., 449 F.2d 245, 245 (9th Cir. 1971).
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disclosure of private facts.89 In Shulman v. GWP, the plaintiff brought
both claims.90 The final three engaged a reputational interest. In Time
v. Hill the plaintiff claimed false light,91 while Hustler v. Falwell and
Pavesich v. New England Life Insurance involved appropriation.92
Moreover, among the four cases in which the plaintiff won on at least
one claim, three related to intrusion and one to appropriation. None, in
other words, involved public disclosure of private facts or false light.
While courts have traditionally had difficulty measuring harms to privacy
interests,93 they may have less difficulty with harms to one’s reputational
interests. While such harms are external to privacy, they are all still
related to personal information, and thus may feel “privacy-like.”
A second way in which these landmark cases are consistent with this
classification into true privacy and reputational interests is that libel and
slander appear as additional claims only in cases of the latter, where the
privacy torts at issue are either false light or appropriation.94 This is
exactly what we would expect given the discussion in the last Subpart.
Like false light and appropriation, the interests protected under libel and
slander are reputational, and not truly privacy-based. We would
therefore expect that they type of circumstance giving rise a false light or
appropriation claim might also give rise to a libel or slander claim.
C. STATUTORY PRIVACY CASES
We can also apply this two-fold classification to help clarify
landmark statutory privacy cases. In Robins v. Spokeo, Robins brought a
Fair Credit Reporting Act95 action against Spokeo claiming that by
running a website that collected public information about people and
offering them to “purchase” their own profile, Spokeo had failed in its
obligation to take reasonable efforts to ensure the accuracy of such
information.96 In United States v. Spokeo, the Federal Trade
Commission used its authority under the Fair Credit Reporting Act to

89. Sidis v. F-R Publishing Corp., 113 F.2d 806, 807 (2d 1940), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 711 (1940).
90. Shulman v. Grp. W Prods., Inc., 955 P.2d 469, 475 (Cal. 1998).
91. Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 376–77 (1967).
92. Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 48 (1988); Pavesich v. New England Life Ins.
Co., 50 S.E. 68, 69 (Ga. 1905).
93. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
94. Pavesich, 50 S.E. at 69; Hustler Magazine, 485 U.S. at 48.
95. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681–1681x (2012).
96. Robins v. Spokeo, Inc., 742 F.3d 409, 413–14 (9th Cir. 2014); see also Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins,
136 S. Ct. 1540, 1545–48 (2016) (vacating and remanding, and holding that the Ninth Circuit failed to
fully consider injury-in-fact requirements when determining that the injury suffered is particularized
but not considering whether it is also concrete); Robins v. Spokeo, Inc., 867 F.3d 1108, 1108 (9th Cir.
2017) (holding that harm suffered by a violation of the FCRA is an injury sufficiently concrete to confer
a plaintiff standing).
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bring a substantially similar action against the website.97 Note that the
central issue in Spokeo was not the existence of the profiles, but rather
the accuracy of the information they contained. In the context of our
model, this Spokeo is a case about a shift the man of someone’s beliefs,
not about its standard deviation. Even though the claims in Robins
v. Spokeo and United States v. Spokeo were brought under the Fair
Credit Reporting Act, the issues raised are intimately related to false light
and appropriation. They respond to reputational interests, rather than to
privacy interests.
Florida Star v. B.J.F.98 and Bartnicki v. Vopper,99 on the other
hand, deal with a privacy interest. Florida Star dealt with a state statute
prohibiting the publication of a sexual assault victim’s name in
instruments of mass communications.100 A local newspaper in
Jacksonville, Florida¾The Florida Star¾successfully challenged the
constitutionality of the statute under the First Amendment.101 Bartinicki,
for its party, involved Title 3 of the Wiretap Act, which imposes liability
on anyone who discloses information obtained in violation of the statute.
Applying strict scrutiny, the Court ruled that the application of the
provision violated the First Amendment. In both cases, what was at stake
was the ability of a third party to obtain true information about the
plaintiff.
Florida Star and Bartnicki are perfect examples of the importance
of distinguishing between reputational interests and privacy interests. In
Florida Star, the majority reasoned that it would be perverse for
defamatory falsehoods to have more protection under the First
Amendment than truthful publications. In so doing, it overlooked the fact
that truthful information is precisely the type of information that is
harmful to one’s privacy. Because of this, in an action based on a harm to
one’s privacy interests, the truthfulness of the information cannot be a
mitigating factor. Similarly, in Bartnicki, Stevens’s opinion is based on
the idea that, since truthful information is involved, the speech warrants
a high degree of protection under the First Amendment. The statute
involved was content-neutral¾it did not relate to a specific conduct like
the statute in Florida Star did¾so an intermediate standard of scrutiny
should have been applied, but the content-neutrality consideration was
97. United States v. Spokeo Inc., No. 12CV05001 (MMM), 2012 WL 3862431 (C.D. Cal. June 19,
2012).
98. Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524 (1989).
99. Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514 (2001).
100. Florida Star, 491 U.S. at 524 (holding that if a news organization lawfully obtains truthful
information, the First Amendment bans prohibiting publication¾unless a strict scrutiny standard is
met).
101. Id.
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overruled by the truthful information consideration. In such way, the
opinion falls into the same pitfall that the Court fell into twelve years
earlier in Florida Star.102
New York Times v. NASA illustrates a similar point. The New York
Times presented a Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”) request to
NASA asking for information related to an accident. The New York Times
requested both a transcript related to the accident and knowledge of what
was recovered after the fact.103 The court ruled that NASA was not
required to submit the information due to exemption 6 of FOIA104¾the
privacy interest of the astronauts’ family members had to be weighed
against the public interest. While the default under FOIA is one of
disclosure, this default is reversed when privacy interests are strong and
the public interest is weak.105 The case presents a familiar tradeoff
between a (in this case strong, according the court) privacy interest and
a (in this case weak, according to the court) public interest in the
information. It also has echoes of Shulman on the question of balancing
a privacy interest with what might be considered valuable information.106

102. The purpose of this discussion is to point out the flaw¾in both cases¾in the court’s reasoning
regarding the privacy implications of truthful statements. While we are not taking a position on the
desirability of granting First Amendment protection to the speech involved or on whether such
tradeoff between free expression and privacy was appropriate, such tradeoff should be identified and
make explicit regardless of the outcome.
103. New York Times v. NASA, 852 F.2d 602 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
104. The exemption provides that agencies should not disclose “personnel and medical files and
similar files the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal
privacy.” 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6) (1988).
105. See New York Times, 852 F.2d at 630–32; see also supra note 2 (arguing that exemption 6
applies a stricter standard than exemption 7.C for the balancing process).
106. See Shulman v. Grp. W. Prods., Inc., 955 P.2d 469 (Cal. 1998). Like in New York Times, the
circumstances in Shulman began with an accident, this time a car accident. The rescue helicopter that
responded to the accident was accompanied by both a video camera operator and a nurse wearing a
microphone, resulting in both audio and video recordings of the plaintiffs, certain individuals who
were involved in the accident and were rescued. These recordings were then edited and used on
Television. The plaintiffs brought two causes of action one based on public disclosure of private facts,
and one based on invasion of privacy by intrusion. The California Supreme Court ruled that because
freedom of the press protects journalists publishing private facts when the material is newsworthy and
of legitimate public concern, summary judgment in favor of the defendants was proper on the first
claim. At the same time, it held that the defendants had no constitutional privilege so to intrude on
plaintiffs’ seclusion and private communications,” Shulman v. Grp. W. Prods., Inc. because of the
method used to obtain the recordings.
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Table 2 shows how these cases fit in the aforementioned scheme.

New York Times v.
NASA (1988)
Florida Star v. B.J.F.
(1989)
Bartnicki v. Vopper
(2001)
United States v. Spokeo
(2012)
Robins v. Spokeo
(2016)

Claim

Outcome

Interest

PDPF

Won

Privacy

PDPF

Lost

Privacy

Intrusion, PDPF

Lost both

Privacy

False light,
Appropriation
False light,
Appropriation

Lost

Reputation

Lost

Reputation

Table 2. Landmark statutory privacy cases according to their protected interests

In these statutory cases, the divergence of interests mentioned
above can be seen as clearly. The first three cases fall squarely under a
privacy interest, while the two cases involving Spokeo claim the two
aspects of the privacy tort that we identified as referring to a reputational
harm. This is unlikely to be a coincidence.
D. NORMATIVE IMPLICATIONS OF THE MODEL’S DISTINCTION
The distinction between true privacy interests and reputational ones
is not purely theoretical. While both can be protected by the same
common law means, understanding the distinction between the two
interests is the first step to more adequately addressing them, and to a
deeper understanding of the policy arguments related to their protection.
Take, for example, the economic argument that if someone is
portrayed under a false light, what will help the person is more
information, not less.107 Privacy is ineffective, the argument goes, at
solving problems of false impressions. We can use this model to
characterize this argument as follows: suppose that, because of false
light, Ben has a mistaken impression of Abby’s type: the mean of his
posterior distribution is too low. The solution is for him to learn even
more about her. As he does so, the false light will gradually have less and
less of an effect on his posterior, until it is entirely overwhelmed by the
truth. On the surface, this seems like a puzzle. After all, we generally think
that the reason we have privacy is not a concern that Ben will get the
wrong idea about Abby; the reason we have privacy is that without it, Ben
will progressively come to have the right idea about Abby.

107. Posner, supra 6, at 408.
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This model of privacy helps see that the reason for the (limited)
success of this critique is that the pro-privacy argument would, in fact,
make little sense if the tort of false light protected a true privacy interest.
However, once we recognize that it is actually protecting a reputational
interest using a privacy rule, the critique becomes easier to address. The
reason for protecting this interest with a privacy rule is pragmatic: people
have limited time and attention. They have neither the time nor the
inclination to acquire and process infinite amounts of information.
Rectification¾the dissemination of truthful information ex post¾as an
alternative means of protecting this reputational interest, might
therefore be ineffective. A rectification may not reach all recipients of the
initial (false) information, or these recipients may simply not bother to
fully process the new information.108
The proposed framework also has implications for the relationship
between privacy and the First Amendment, a relationship that has long
troubled the Supreme Court.109 The leading case, Hustler Magazine v.
Falwell, in which the Court ruled that a public figure does not have
redress for emotional distress caused by a caricature that a reasonable
person would not interpret as factual,110 illustrates this idea particularly
well. Even though ruling in Hustler’s favor, the Court’s holding in Falwell
rests partly on the argument that false or misleading statements, such as
the caricatures published by Hustler, are valueless, and sometimes even
harmful, in the market of ideas.111 In other words, the Court drew a
distinction between true facts (covered by the first two privacy torts),
which implicate First Amendment protection, and misleading facts
(covered by the third privacy tort), which do not.112 This traces back to
the distinction between privacy’s two protected interests.
The distinction between these two interests has profound
implications for the relationship between privacy and the First
Amendment. Specifically, it gives us a framework for analyzing the extent
to which a piece of information’s truth can be used as a First Amendment
defense for disclosures that could be privacy invasive. Privacy-based
limitations to the disclosure of truthful information are difficult to
sustain under the First Amendment. Consequently, when the First

108. JEFFREY ROSEN, THE UNWANTED GAZE: THE DESTRUCTION OF PRIVACY IN AMERICA (2000);
Lawrence Lessig, Privacy and Attention Span, 89 GEO. L.J. 2063, 2063–64 (2001).
109. Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 530–33 (1989); Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 484–88
(1988). See Post, Constitutional Concepts, supra note 75, at 615.
110. Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988).
111. Post, Constitutional Concepts, supra note 75, at 613 (citing Hustler Magazine v. Falwell,
485 U.S. 46, 55 (1988)).
112. The fourth tort, which hinges on the use of one’s image, does not relate to facts at all, neither
collaborating nor harming the marketplace of ideas.
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Amendment is involved, the torts referring to the true privacy interest
should be given more prominence than those that refer to a reputational
interest.
In Falwell, the court decided that truthful information is entitled to
more First Amendment protection than misleading information.113
Nevertheless, as a political community, we might want to give a higher
level of protection to plaintiffs who have experienced a privacy harm due
to the dissemination of truthful information. The Court addressed this
issue in Florida Star v. B.J.F., where the newspaper, The Florida Star,
revealed the name of a sexual assault victim, in violation of State law. The
Court ruled that it would be a perverse result if the First Amendment
protected a truthful publication less than it protects defamatory
falsehood.114 This ignores the degree to which the dissemination of true
information can be privacy invasive, and hence how harmful it can be.115
Our framework can help clarify this. The dividing line for the relationship
between privacy and the First Amendment protected speech should be
determined not only by whether the information is truthful, but rather by
how much harm the victim would sustain relative to the social benefit of
disclosing this information. In Florida Star, for example, the harm to the
victim might have been quite substantial, while the social benefits of
knowing her name might have been small.
The role of truth in information leads to our model’s third
implication. Analyzing privacy claims in terms of the truth (or lack
thereof) of the information is justified only in cases where what is at stake
is a reputational interest, and not when it is a privacy interest. To dismiss
a privacy claim because the statement at issue is false when the protected
interest is a reputational one (such as false light) would be a mistake. The
core of any reputational harm is that the plaintiff’s reputation has been
wrongfully degraded in the eyes of a third party. The harm¾the wrongful
degradation of the victim’s reputation¾is inflicted by the falseness of the
assertion. The truthfulness of the statements in question therefore lie at
the core of reputational protection.
On the other hand, truthfulness cannot be a valid defense when
privacy is the protected interest. As we have shown, the central feature of
protecting an individual’s privacy interest is to measure how she is
harmed by when another learns more about her. If someone learns
113. Falwell, 485 U.S. at 56 (“we conclude that public figures and public officials may not recover
for the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress by reason of publications such as the one here
at issue without showing an addition that the publication contains a false statement of fact which was
made with ‘actual malice’”) Id.
114. Florida Star, 491 U.S. at 540–41; see also supra Subpart B.
115. In this case in particular, it undervalued how harmful it was for sexual assault victims to have
their names disclosed publicly.
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something false about her, this might harm her reputation¾as discussed
above¾but it does not affect her privacy. In other words, the truthfulness
of the information in question increases the harm to the victim. Privacy
harms refer to a protection over certain aspects of our private life, while
reputational harms refer to a protection over undeserved attacks to one’s
public persona. True information, therefore, is especially harmful for
privacy interests, while false information is harmful for reputational
interests.
This explains why an effective rectification can address a
reputational harm, but cannot address a privacy harm. Provided it can
overcome the fact that people have limited time and attention, new,
truthful, information can often dilute or nullify the harmful effect of false
information.116 When the harm is to a privacy interest, in contrast, more
truthful information can never help. Privacy harms can at best be
reduced with the passage of time and people’s faulty memories¾if not
recorded online.117 If Cameron had evidence that the embarrassing event
of which he was accused had not taken place, he could at least partially
remedy his reputation by presenting it to the public. Assuming that this
evidence was seen as credible, the harm to his reputation would have
been substantially mitigated. If, on the other hand, what had been
disclosed was a true and embarrassing fact about his preferences, so that
people’s probability distribution about him would be narrowed, more
information would only have produced more harm.
Finally, our framework suggests that a revaluation of the harm
standards used in adjudicating privacy and related torts is in order. The
main difference between the privacy tort and other related torts (such as
libel, slander, and intentional infliction of emotional distress), is that the
privacy tort does not require the plaintiff to prove a separate harm.
Instead, the loss of privacy is itself sufficient.118 This is, deep down, an
evidentiary difference. In cases involving the privacy tort, courts can
assume that a privacy harm is already present. In contrast, a plaintiff
must prove harm in a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress,
and must prove reputational harm in an action for libel or slander.
Our model, along with the foregoing analysis, makes clear that this
lower evidentiary standard should apply only to claims based on a true
116. See ROSEN, supra note 108.
117. See VIKTOR MAYER-SCHÖNBERGER, DELETE: THE VIRTUE OF FORGETTING IN THE DIGITAL AGE
(2009) (arguing that there should be a time limit for online information, emulating people’s memories,
to protect people’s privacy online).
118. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652H (AM. LAW. INST. 1977); see also Socialist Workers
Party v. Attorney Gen. of the U.S., 642 F. Supp. 1357, 1421 (S.D.N.Y. 1986); Manville v. Borg-Warner
Corp., 418 F.2d 434, 437 (10th Cir. 1969); Cason v. Baskin, 159 So.2d 635, 340 (Fla. 1947) (cited in
Post, Constitutional Concepts, supra note 75, at 624.)
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privacy interest, not to reputational interests protected by privacy rules.
In other words, only intrusion upon seclusion and public disclosure of
private facts should be subject to this lower evidentiary burden. Since
false light and appropriation do not imply by themselves a harm to the
victim’s true privacy interest, some indication of diminished
reputation¾similarly to that required for libel and slander¾should be
required for them.
IV. FOURTH AMENDMENT DOCTRINAL CONSEQUENCES
This model can also help to clarify an important area of
constitutional law: the much criticized Fourth Amendment third party
doctrine. The key problems with this doctrine stem from the fact that it
rests on an unsatisfying conception of privacy that views privacy as
secrecy, and it does so in a dichotomous way. The considerations set
above are also relevant for a controversial case currently before the
Supreme Court: Carpenter v. United States.
A. THE THIRD PARTY DOCTRINE: LAW AND EXISTING CRITIQUES
1. Judicial Critiques
In Katz v. United States, the Supreme Court held that a search or
seizure violates the Fourth Amendment if conducted against reasonable
expectations of privacy.119 When a person makes a call from a telephone
booth with the door shut, the court held, that person is entitled to such
expectation.120 As a result, the government must procure a warrant to
record such a conversation.121 The third party doctrine is used to define
the scope of a reasonable expectation of privacy under the Fourth
Amendment.122 It establishes that, when someone voluntarily discloses
information to a third party, she has no reasonable expectation of privacy
over that information (United States v. Miller, Smith v. Maryland)¾and
thus the government can obtain and use that that information without a
warrant.123

119. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 350–53 (1967).
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. The Fourth Amendment protects “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures . . . .” U.S. CONST., amend. IV.
123. United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 433 (1976); Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 744 (1979).
In Miller,
[t]he depositor takes the risk, in revealing his affairs to another, that the information will
be conveyed by that person to the Government. This Court has held repeatedly that the
Fourth Amendment does not prohibit the obtaining of information revealed to a third party
and conveyed by him to Government authorities, even if the information is revealed on the
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The Supreme Court first used the third party doctrine to define
reasonable expectations of privacy in Smith v. Maryland, where it held
that using pen registers to obtain what numbers a person has dialed is
not a search, and therefore does not require a warrant.124 The line of
reasoning is as follows: the Court had held before that people have no
reasonable expectation of privacy with respect to information that is
voluntarily conveyed to others.125 In other words, when Smith was
decided, if Abby had talked to Ben and he had repeated what Abby had
said to the police (she was “betrayed by her confidant”), there would have
been no Fourth Amendment violation.126 The Court had determined in
On Lee v. United States and Lopez v. United States, that the presence of
electronic recording did not change this Fourth Amendment analysis.127
Rather than repeating to the police what Abby said, the argument goes,
Ben could have recorded her and handed the recording to the police.
Moreover, the Court had held in United States v. White that the
reasonable expectations of privacy rule and the protections afforded by
Katz do not alter this conclusion.128 As a result, Smith had no Fourth
Amendment protection because he had “voluntarily conveyed numerical
information to the telephone company.”129
The Court had used an equivalent criterion before in Miller for bank
records. It held that people have no expectation of privacy over bank
records because these are voluntarily shared with the bank.130 Smith
consolidated the principle, known as the third party doctrine, that
information shared with third parties has no protection under the Fourth
Amendment.
Many have criticized the Court’s reasoning in Smith. Some lower
courts have evidenced discomfort with it even when considering

assumption that it will be used only for a limited purpose and the confidence placed in the
third party will not be betrayed.
425 U.S. at 443 (citation omitted). In Smith, “this Court consistently has held that a person has no
legitimate expectation of privacy in information he voluntarily turns over to third parties.” 442 U.S. at
743–44.
124. Smith, 442 U.S. at 742.
125. Id. at 743 (“This Court consistently has held that a person has no legitimate expectation of
privacy in information he voluntarily turns over to third parties.”).
126. Id.
127. On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747, 753 (1952); Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 440
(1963).
128. United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 752–53 (1971); See also Katz v. United States, 389 U.S.
347, 351–52 (1967) (citation omitted) (“[w]hat a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his
own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection. But what he seeks to preserve
as private, even in an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected.”).
129. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 744 (1979).
130. United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 440–42 (1976).
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themselves bound by it.131 In his dissent in White, Justice Harlan argued
that to think that every time one talks with a friend one is assuming the
risk of being recorded is to misunderstand the set of behaviors that
constitute normal social interactions. While the possibility of being
betrayed to the police is a part or normal social interactions, being
recorded is not.132 Under Harlan’s view, the scope of normal social
interactions should be central to the third party doctrine, just as it is to
the concept of a reasonable expectation of privacy more broadly.
Similarly, in Florida v. Riley, where the police observed a marijuana
plantation from the air, O’Connor’s concurring opinion mirrors Harlan’s
dissent in White in defining reasonable expectations of privacy. While
not primarily concerned with the third party doctrine, her opinion is
nevertheless informative. In it, she argued that what is relevant for
privacy is not whether the helicopter that was used to fly over Riley’s
property was legally entitled to fly at the height at which it did (as it was
in the majority opinion), but rather that objects flying at such height are
“a sufficiently routine part of modern life [so] that it is unreasonable for
persons on the ground to expect that their curtilage will not be observed
from the air at that altitude.”133 By leaving something exposed to objects
that routinely fly at that height, Riley ran the risk that they could be
viewed by third parties.
The majority opinion in Kyllo v. United States saw the issue in the
same way. There, the case centered on the use of thermal imaging to
detect heat coming from inside a person’s home. The Court stated that, if
the thermal imaging technology at issue had been in common use in
society, the information collection would have fallen outside of one’s
expectations of privacy. Because it was not, the use of thermal imaging
was held to be illegal.134 This is in tension with the majority’s reasoning
in Riley. Under the reasoning in Riley, one should conclude that Kyllo
would have no expectation of privacy as long as the use of thermal
131. See United States v. Davis, 785 F.3d 498, 519–21 (11th Cir. 2015) (en banc) (Pryor, J.,
concurring) (“If the third-party doctrine results in an unacceptable ‘slippery slope,’ the Supreme Court
can tell us as much”); id. at 525 (Rosenbaum, J., concurring):
[U]nless a person is willing to live ‘off the grid,’ it is nearly impossible to avoid disclosing
the most personal of information to third-party service providers on a constant basis, just
to navigate daily life. And the thought that the government should be able to access such
information without the basic protection that a warrant offers is nothing less than chilling.
United States v. Graham, 824 F.3d 421, 425 (4th Cir. 2016) (en banc) (“The Supreme Court may in the
future limit, or even eliminate, the third-party doctrine.”); id. (Stranch, J., concurring) (“[W]e need to
develop a new test to determine when a warrant may be necessary under these or comparable
circumstances.”).
132. White, 401 U.S. at 776–77 (Harlan, J., dissent).
133. Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 453 (1989) (O’Connor, J., concurring).
134. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 40 (2001).
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imaging is legal. The majority opinion in Dow Chemical v. United States,
in which the Court asked whether the aerial camera used was accessible
to the general population, also followed this line of reasoning.135
2. Doctrinal Critiques and Proposals
We are hardly the first to argue that the third party doctrine is deeply
flawed. In its current form, the third party doctrine is almost certain to
lead to a progressive erosion of privacy: as technologies advance and
become ever more widespread, and as more means of communication
require an intermediary, more “third parties” are involved in people’s
communications.136 It would be wrong to argue that, simply because the
standard means of communication have mutated into more convenient
ones, people should progressively have less privacy.137 Nevertheless, this
is exactly what the third party doctrine implies.138 This runs counter to
the whole scholarly privacy conversation, which centers on how to
maintain people’s privacy with the advent of technologies that facilitate
the gathering, storing and disseminating personal information.139
The artificiality of creating a dichotomy between keeping something
“private” and sharing it with one or a few particular individuals is
especially evident in a networked world, where being part of society
necessarily means selectively sharing information. This idea is captured
by Marshall’s dissent in Smith, which emphasizes the petitioner’s lack of
choice in communicating through a means that involves a third party
intermediary.
The third party doctrine is built on the argument that, when people
share information with another party, they willingly assume a risk of
leakage.140 But this assumption of risk argument implies the existence of

135. Dow Chemical Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 234–39 (1986).
136. Jack M. Balkin, Information Fiduciaries and the First Amendment, 49 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
1183, 1225–26 (2016).
137. Kerr, for example, believes that we should use “equilibrium-adjustment,” and apply the
Fourth Amendment to situation in which technological changes are involved in a way that we maintain
the level of constitutional protection constant. Orin S. Kerr, An Equilibrium-Adjustment Theory of the
Fourth Amendment, 125 HARV. L. REV. 476 (2011) [hereinafter Kerr, An Equilibrium-Adjustment]; see
also Orin S. Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and the Global Internet, 67 STAN. L. REV. 285 (2015)
[hereinafter Kerr, The Fourth Amendment].
138. Kerr, An Equilibrium-Adjustment, supra note 137, at 482-93 (introducing the theory of
equilibrium-adjustment); Kerr, The Fourth Amendment, supra note 137 (showing how equilibriumadjustment responds to the issues of internet surveillance).
139. See Sherry F. Colb, What Is a Search? Two Conceptual Flaws in Fourth Amendment Doctrine
and Some Hints of a Remedy, 55 STAN. L. REV. 119 (2002) (arguing that the Supreme Court has
devaluated Fourth Amendment privacy). Someone could counter-argue that technology brings both
privacy-invading and privacy-enhancing possibilities, but our experience shows that the former tend
to outnumber and outpower the latter.
140. See supra text accompanying notes 83-89.
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an unexercised choice to use other means, and members of our society
do not have a real choice to use many of the means of communication
that are rendered non-private by the third party doctrine. In this regard,
Marshall objected to the notion that “unless a person is prepared to forgo
use of what for many has become a personal or professional necessity, he
cannot help but accept the risk of surveillance.”141
While taking the doctrines in the right direction, Marshall’s position
is insufficient. The dissent does not propose a resolution to the question
of what constitutes a choice. Are we choosing to put our information at
risk by sending a non-encrypted email? What about by sending an e-mail
at all, as opposed to a letter through (arguably more secure) airmail?
To solve the problems created by the influence of technology in the
third party doctrine, Jack Balkin introduces the concept of “information
fiduciaries.”142 “An information fiduciary is a person or business who,
because of their relationship with another, has taken on special duties
with respect to the information they obtain in the course of the
relationship.”143 In the digital age, Balkin explains, we have no choice but
to trust our information to online service providers and, when we do, we
should expect such information to be treated according to a relationship
of trust.144 This alters our reasonable expectation of privacy as it places
information intermediaries alongside lawyers and doctors, excepted
from the assumption of the third party doctrine that the information is
publicized when it is shared.145 This approach is compatible with
Marshall’s focus on whether we have an option to disclose the
information to the third party. It is also helpful to keep the “equilibrium”
of privacy and the Fourth Amendment with the emergence of new
technologies,146 and to develop a more robust set of exceptions in which
the third party doctrine is not applied, thereby avoiding some of its most
objectionable results. The existence of information intermediaries, which
could be turned into information fiduciaries, increases the number of
141. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 750 (1979) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
142. Balkin, supra note 136, at 1205–09; see also Neil M. Richards & Woodrow Hartzog, Taking
Trust Seriously in Privacy Law, 19 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 431 (2016) (proposing that privacy law should
further rely on trust in the use of information, similarly to fiduciary law).
143. Balkin, supra note 136, at 1209.
144. Balkin, supra note 136, at 1230–31. (“We have a reasonable expectation, in other words, that
people and organizations who owe duties of trust and confidence to us will not betray us.”).
145. Balkin, supra note 136, at 1230–31 (“We provide lots of information about ourselves¾some of
it quite sensitive¾to people and organizations who owe us fiduciary duties or duties of confidentiality.
And when we provide this information, we have, and should have, a reasonable expectation that they will
respect our privacy.”); Kiel Brennan-Marquez, Fourth Amendment Fiduciaries, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 611,
611 (2015) (arguing that not only the third party doctrine is in need of modification, but the whole Fourth
Amendment doctrine’s approach to general information is).
146. See Kerr, An Equilibrium-Adjustment, supra note 121; Kerr, The Fourth Amendment, supra
note 121.
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cases in which the third party doctrine generates undesirable
outcomes.147 Today, an immense amount of personal information is
collected and stored by private third parties. Much of this information
then flows to the government, who can create detailed records of
individuals that seem to stand at odds with the Fourth Amendment.148
Unlike the proponents of the information fiduciaries theory, we do
not seek to expand the exceptions to the current third party doctrine.
Rather, in the next Subpart, we argue for a new approach to privacy
under the Fourth Amendment.
B. IMPLICATIONS OF OUR MODEL
1. A Way Forward
In line with the information fiduciaries idea, our model shows that
the core problem with the third party doctrine is that it interprets privacy
as secrecy, and it does so in a dichotomous way.149 Sherry Colb has
demonstrated that the post-Katz Fourth Amendment decisions have
narrowed the scope of reasonable expectations of privacy by treating
“exposure to a limited audience as morally equivalent to exposure to the
whole world.”150 This can be seen, for example, in cases defining Fourth
Amendment protection over garbage. In California v. Greenwood, where
the Court asked whether examining garbage left on the street in a closed
opaque bag is a Fourth Amendment search,151 one of the key arguments
was that the individual deliberately handed the garbage to a third person:
the garbage collector, who could have potentially opened the bag and
exposed its contents when moving it to the truck.152
Our model shows why this equivalence is misguided. What is
disclosed to one person cannot be treated as though it has been publicly
disclosed (and therefore unconcealed), rendering further disclosure
147. New technologies sometimes impose new problems for the law. They blur distinctions that
were formerly clear, they introduce new slippery slopes, and they demand analogies that are unobvious
to interpreters. But, often, new technologies make salient problems that the law already had. They
bring counterexamples that were nonexistent and take contradictions, assumptions and circularities
to surface.
148. Daniel J. Solove, Digital Dossiers and the Dissipation of Fourth Amendment Privacy,
75 S. CAL. L. REV. 1083, 1084–86 (2002). But see generally Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S.
398, 402 (2013) (denying standing because the injury is not “certainly impeding”).
149. See Andrew D. Selbst, Contextual Expectations of Privacy, 35 CARDOZO L. REV. 643, 657–59
(2013) (arguing that Fourth Amendment doctrine is disconnected from society’s conception of privacy
because courts rely on binary distinctions, and reexamining the meaning of the Fourth Amendment’s
“reasonable expectation of privacy” using the theory of contextual integrity).
150. Colb, supra note 139, at 122 (also showing that this followed a prior analytical move of
equating risk of exposure with an invitation to such exposure).
151. See generally California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35 (1988).
152. Colb, supra note 139, at 153–55.
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harmless. Absolute secrecy is a narrow and hardly defensible conception
of privacy that runs contrary to our intuitions about privacy. To use a
popular example, describing a man on a deserted island (who shares his
information with no one) as a very private man would be meaningless.153
This conception of privacy has also been met with resistance in privacy
scholarship, where most consider it not to be privacy’s meaning.154 This
problem is enhanced by the dichotomous view of privacy.155 Under a
more complete conception of privacy, it becomes clear that the current
third party doctrine leads to counterintuitive and objectionable results.156
Carpenter is a perfect illustration of how the model above helps
identify the problems with this doctrine. During a criminal investigation,
the government procured 152 days of historical cellphone location data
from Timothy Carpenter without securing a warrant. It did so based on
the Stored Communications Act (“SCA”), which contemplates disclosure
orders without need for a probable cause as long as there are “specific
and articulable facts showing that there are reasonable grounds to believe
that the contents of a wire or electronic communication, or the records
or other information sought, are relevant and material to an ongoing
criminal investigation.”157
Carpenter asked to suppress the records, arguing that the SCA’s
reasonable grounds standard violates the Fourth Amendment.158 The
district court denied the motion and stated that acquiring cellphone
records is not a search, relying on United States v. Skinner, which held
that no warrant is needed to procure short-term and real-time tracking
of suspects’ cellphones.159 The Sixth Circuit, in a three-judge divided
panel, affirmed, holding that there is no expectation of privacy, and no
Fourth Amendment protection for these location records because they
are business records that reveal routing information and not the content

153. See Fried, supra note 27.
154. See supra Part I.A; Solove, supra note 148.
155. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1391 (2d ed. 1988) (arguing that the
tendency of the Supreme Court to treat privacy as a discrete commodity is alarming); Susan W.
Brenner & Leo L. Clarke, Fourth Amendment Protection for Shared Privacy Rights in Stored
Transactional Data, 14 J.L. POL’Y 211, 258 (2005) (arguing that a controlled disclosure to a third party
is not equivalent to an indiscriminate disclosure).
156. Crocker has even argued that the third party doctrine places information privacy into conflict
with decisional privacy. As argued for decisional privacy in Lawrence v. Texas, privacy protects, and
therefore the government cannot interfere with, intimate conducts that take place within interpersonal
relationships¾thus making clear that privacy does not only protect what we keep to ourselves.
Thomas P. Crocker, From Privacy to Liberty: The Fourth Amendment After Lawrence, 57 UCLA L.
REV. 1, 23–25 (2009). See generally Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (finding that Petitioners
were entitled respect for their private lives).
157. 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d)(2012).
158. Brief of Petitioner-Appellant at 36a, Carpenter v. United States, No. 16-402 (Aug. 7, 2017).
159. Carpenter v. United States, No. 12-20218, 2013 WL 6385838, at *2 (E.D. Mich. Dec. 6, 2013).
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of communications.160 In doing so, the Sixth Circuit relied on Smith v.
Maryland and the third party doctrine.161 The Supreme Court heard oral
arguments for the case on November 29, 2017.
If the Court were to simply apply the third party doctrine to
Carpenter, it would hold that he had no reasonable expectation of
privacy regarding his geolocation, as he shared it with his telephone
provider.162 This has been the central argument of the U.S. government
in its brief and the oral arguments.163 Our discussion above shows why
this conclusion would be mistaken.164 Sharing his location with his
telephone provider (on which he had no choice) does not cause Carpenter
the same disutility as sharing it with the entire world¾including the U.S.
government.
Under our model, revealing information to a party implies a
reduction in the standard deviation of his posterior (a privacy loss). The
current third party doctrine would use this reduction as a reason for
imposing a further reduction in standard deviation (this is, there will
now be a tightening of another individual’s distribution) by passing the
information along to another party. This is illogical. Abby might tell
something to Caroline because her loss in privacy (if any) is compensated
by a gain in friendship produced by the disclosure, but this does not imply
that Abby is unharmed if the information is given also to Ben.165
While this problem is magnified in a networked world, it also occurs
with the use of technologies that have existed for some time. For example,
consider the release by the news site Gawker of a private recording made
160. Carpenter v. United States, 819 F.3d 880, 884 (6th Cir. 2015).
161. But see id. at 892–93 (Stranch, C.J., concurring) (arguing that the case, given the quantity of
sensitive information procured, raises issues similar to those of United States v. Jones, but invoking a
good faith exception to the exclusionary rule).
162. See infra note (insert for new Steven Shavell cite).
163. Brief of Respondent-Appellee at 12–26, Carpenter v. United States, No. 16-402 (Aug. 7, 2017);
transcript of oral argument at 41, https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument
_transcripts/2017/16-402_6khn.pdf (Deputy Solicitor General arguing that “[companies] make
decisions based on their own business needs about what they’re going to retain. And when the
government comes and asks them to produce it, it is doing the same thing that it did in Smith. It is
doing the same thing that it did in Miller. It is asking a business to provide information about the
business’s own transactions with a customer. And under the third party doctrine, that does not
implicate the Fourth Amendment rights of the customer.”).
164. In the oral arguments, the Court discussed the moderating principles we surveyed earlier. For
example, Justice Breyer said that “the law is at the moment [that] third-party information is thirdparty [doctrine], with a few exceptions, but it maybe that here another exception should exist for the
reason that the technology, since the time those cases have¾has changed dramatically.” Transcripts,
supra note 163, at 65. At the same time, however, the Court recognized the extreme difficulty of line
drawing for this issue. Transcripts, supra note 163, at 66–73.
165. This is based, once again, on a linear conception of privacy. A more complex version of the
model would include context. We could think of Abby’s relationships with different people as different
distributions. Such version would make this argument, and thus would reject the viability of the
third party doctrine, in a stronger way.
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by Terry Gene Bollea (Hulk Hogan) having intercourse with his neighbor.
The recording received significant media attention.166 The jury ruled in
favor of Bollea, finding that Gawker breached his privacy (public
disclosure of private facts) and awarding him $115 million in damages.167
Under the logic of the third party doctrine, if it were applied this privacy
tort, Bollea would have had no privacy interest in the tape. There was no
absolute secrecy because he was, after all, in the company of another
person. There was, therefore, at least one other person who was aware of
the contents of the recording. This would certainly be an absurd
conclusion independently of whether the third party to whom the
information is shared is another individual or the government, which
shows how the problems of the third party doctrine, while increased by
information intermediaries, predate them.
Similarly, the rule would also reach absurd results if applied to
information shared with lawyers, priests, doctors or psychologists.168
These cases could until now be taken as exceptions produced by their
fiduciary duties, but new technologies have made ubiquitous those cases
in which the third party doctrine would lead to objectionable results.169
Because the type of communications for which the third party doctrine
does not work has changed from being an exception to being the rule,
listing exceptions cannot continue to correct for its root problems for
much longer.
The information fiduciaries solution would represent enormous
progress for current Fourth Amendment law.170 Like Marshall’s options
approach, it does not attempt to solve the root problem of the third party
doctrine, built on a dichotomous conception of privacy.171 The solution
does not intend do away with the third party doctrine but to limit its
application to those entities that are not considered fiduciaries, therefore
reducing most of its damage.172
166. Matt Ford, In First Round with Gawker, Hulk Hogan Prevails, ATLANTIC (Mar. 19, 2016, 1:20
AM), http://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2016/03/gawker-hulk-hogan-verdict/474528/.
167. Id.
168. Balkin, supra note 136.
169. Balkin, supra note 136, at 1231 (noting “that this would not be the end of the third-party
doctrine. It would still continue to apply in all cases in which we provide information to someone who
is not an information fiduciary. In fact, the concept of information fiduciaries is especially helpful
because it gives us an intermediate position between enforcing the third-party doctrine as it currently
stands and getting rid of it entirely.”).
170. The idea also addresses problems for privacy in consumer law, such as imposing duties on
such fiduciaries while avoiding constitutional challenges based on the First Amendment. See Balkin,
supra note 136, at 1231.
171. Reducing privacy to a dichotomous is not inherent to the fiduciary solution (or to the options
solution) but part of the structure of the third party doctrine. The theory could be more useful to solve
problems in Fourth Amendment doctrine if disposed from this dichotomous conception.
172. Balkin, supra note 136, at 1231.
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This makes the idea of information fiduciaries implementable,
realistic, and helpful. Applying the third party doctrine while accepting
the idea of information fiduciaries would have changed the results of
Miller and Smith because there was an intermediary with a relationship
of trust involved¾the bank and the telephone company, respectively.173
However, it would also have (mistakenly) led to rule in favor of the
government in United States v. Jones174 and Riley v. California because
there was no information fiduciary involved to introduce an exception to
the third party doctrine, and it would have (again mistakenly) not
changed the outcome of White for the same reason. By creating a set of
exceptions, the information fiduciaries proposal helps to alleviate the
new problems that new technologies pose for the doctrine. But no
solution other than doing away with the third party doctrine altogether
can address its root problems: a mistaken assumption of what privacy is
and the conditions under which it is appropriate to assume that a person
placed a piece of information at risk of public disclosure.
Whereas Fourth Amendment doctrine has defined search, and
therefore privacy, in a dichotomous way, our model makes clear that
privacy is properly understood as a continuum. On the surface, these two
conceptions¾dichotomous versus continuous¾seem irreconcilable.
They are not. By combining this model with some of the most
fundamental concepts in the common law tradition, we propose how to
address the third party doctrine.
2. Care and Culpability: Two Instances of Cutoff Rules
Drawing on our model, we propose an alternative solution. We have
already argued that privacy is best viewed as a continuum. We argue that
courts should take this into account when determining whether an action
qualifies as a search for the purposes of the Fourth Amendment. We
make this argument in three steps. First, we show that the law is already
equipped to deal with the problem of converting a continuum into a
yes/no dichotomy by pointing to both substantive criminal law and tort
law. We then draw on concepts borrowed from tort law, and show that
the current third party doctrine is the privacy equivalent of a strict
liability rule. We then argue that this rule is inappropriate, and that a
negligence style standard is more appropriate.

173. This could, and perhaps should, have been the result for Miller even without the idea of
information fiduciaries, given that the Bank Secrecy Act required banks to keep such records
confidential. 12 U.S.C. § 1829b(d) (2012). The Court dismissed the importance of this rule under the
argument that Miller could not assert ownership over the records, which were owned by the bank.
United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 440–42 (1976).
174. United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 413–21 (2012).
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The law is full of instances in which a continuous variable is
converted into a dichotomous outcome. In criminal law, for example,
Section 2.02 of the Model Penal Code defines the different levels of
culpability as: purposely, knowingly, recklessly, and negligently.175 Each
of these represents a cutoff point. The law defines crimes as requiring a
level of culpability at least as great as the level specified in the statute.
In fact, in section 2.02(5), the Code acknowledges the continuous nature
of culpability by establishing a hierarchy between levels and stating that
each of them is encompassed by the others.176 If one can use cutoff points
along a continuum to define culpability for substantive criminal law,
there is no reason why one cannot do the same for criminal procedure.
We find a similar set of cutoffs along a continuum in the tort law
context. This is a particularly appropriate parallel to the Fourth
Amendment context since, at the time of a search, one is not interested
in assigning blame. In the tort context, a finding of negligence implies a
lower standard of culpability than a finding of recklessness for it. As a
result, behavior that might be held to be tortious under a negligence
standard might not be sufficient to meet a recklessness standard. At the
extreme lies a strict liability standard, where only cause, and no
subjective element, is required for culpability. While under recklessness
or negligence one can perform the activity in question while insulating
oneself from potential liability (by doing so with care), under a strict
liability standard, there is nothing one can do other than abstaining from
the activity altogether.
3. The Third Party Doctrine as Strict Liability
The current third party doctrine is the equivalent of strict liability in
privacy law.177 There is no action that Abby can take, other than not
verbalizing the information, to keep it within the scope of the Fourth
Amendment’s protections. This is roughly equivalent to saying that there
is nothing that Abby can do to keep herself from being liable for the

175. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(a)–(d).
176.
Substitutes for Negligence, Recklessness and Knowledge. When the law provides that
negligence suffices to establish an element of an offense, such element also is established if
a person acts purposely, knowingly or recklessly. When recklessness suffices to establish an
element, such element also is established if a person acts purposely or knowingly. When
acting knowingly suffices to establish an element, such element also is established if a
person acts purposely.
MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(5).
177. Cf. Colb, supra note 139, at 144–46 (advancing the similar argument that the concept of
“knowing exposure” is equivalent to search consent and this equivalence make them analogous to the
often criticized strict liability criminal offenses, albeit lacking their public welfare justifying rationale).
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disclosure.178 In the same way that a factory that builds widgets under a
strict liability rule can eliminate potential liability only by abstaining
from production altogether, Abby can only ensure that her privacy is
protected under the Fourth Amendment by abstaining from any
disclosure. In other words, just as there is no level of care that is sufficient
to protect a potential tortfeasor from liability under a strict liability rule,
there is no series of steps Abby can take, short of staying silent, to ensure
that the content of her disclosure cannot be accessed by the police. Yet,
while there are good reasons to have strict liability in some tort contexts,
these reasons do not carry over to the Fourth Amendment context.
4. Strict Liability and Culpability Appropriateness
The most common places where one can find liability in tort law are
products liability and liability for inherently dangerous activities. While
the argument for the former is economic in nature, the argument for the
latter tends to be principle-driven. We argue that the both arguments are
inapposite in the Fourth Amendment context.
From an efficiency perspective, strict liability is efficient when the
probability of the accident can only be controlled by the potential
tortfeasor and this probability is determined by both the tortfeasor’s level
of care and activity. More specifically, strict liability is efficient when one
party can most efficiently bear the risk of harm.179 A key aspect of the
economic approach to tort law is its focus on dynamic efficiency: the goal
is less to ensure an efficient outcome ex post than it is to create incentives
for efficient behavior ex ante.
Using this framework, it is difficult to see how a strict liability rule
is compatible with the Fourth Amendment. To begin with, there is no
reasonable analogy between product liability¾a commercial
context¾and a social conversation between two humans.
Moreover, while there is undoubtedly a worthy social goal
involved¾solving crimes¾the third party doctrine goes about advancing
this goal only from an ex post perspective. Only after the information has
been transmitted from Abby to Ben does the third party doctrine come
into play, and ensures an ex post transfer of that information on to the
police. From an ex ante perspective, however, the third party doctrine
does nothing to create efficient incentives to disclose information in the
first place. On the contrary, it creates incentives for individuals to guard

178. See Ignacio Cofone, The Dynamic Effect of Information Privacy Law, 18 MINN. J.L. SCI. &
TECH 517, 534–542 (2017) (explaining that disclosure can be seen as production of personal
information).
179. STEVEN SHAVELL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF ACCIDENT LAW 5–46 (2007).
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their information as closely as possible. While this may make little
difference to the police, the collateral social consequences are troubling.
In fact, the collateral social consequences of the third party doctrine
are similar in many respects to the consequences of eschewing
informational privacy altogether. There is a consensus among scholars
that privacy, in general, encourages other values such as autonomy,
personhood, and free speech,180 so much so that most privacy
considerations discussed in Part I, either explicitly or implicitly, rest on
this argument. The logic behind this is simple: if, after Abby discloses
something to Ben, she has no guarantee that this information won’t be
passed on to someone else, she will simply talk to Ben less. From Abby’s
perspective, this risk¾which, in the context of the third party doctrine,
includes the risk that the information will be passed on to law
enforcement¾represents a cost of disclosure. If the law is such that turns
every member of society into a potential police informant, Abby now lives
in a society that we would consider undesirable.
We recognize that the third party doctrine is not solely a question of
efficiency. Similarly, tort law also uses strict liability for inherently
dangerous activities or things, such as fireworks or dangerous animals.181
In such cases, there is generally an underlying sense that what the
tortfeasor has done is morally suspect, though not necessarily wrongful.
The moral intuition behind strict liability in such cases follows from this
sense that the tortfeasor had no business engaging in these activities to
begin with.
This argument for strict liability is even less appropriate in the
Fourth Amendment context. There is nothing morally questionable
about most interpersonal communications. And while there may be a
vague sense that anyone under investigation by the police is tarred with
a veneer of criminality, this intuition is at odds with the presumption of
innocence, which is the bedrock principle of the criminal justice system.

180. See supra Part I.A.
181. According to the Second Restatement of Torts,
(1) Once who carries on an abnormally dangerous activity is subject to liability for harm to
the person, land or chattels of another resulting from the activity, although he has exercised
the utmost care to prevent the harm. (2) This strict liability is limited to the kind of harm,
the possibility of which makes the activity abnormally dangerous.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 519 (2nd 1979);
(1) A possessor of a wild animal is subject to liability to another for harm done by the animal
to the other, his person, land or chattels, although the possessor has exercised the utmost
care to confine the animal, or otherwise prevent it from doing harm. (2) This liability is
limited to harm that results from a dangerous propensity that is characteristic of wild
animals of the particular class, or of which the possessor knows or has reason to know.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 507 (2nd 1979).
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As Cynthia Lee has pointed out, the Supreme Court has long
characterized the Fourth Amendment as operating under a
reasonableness analysis:
The Supreme Court’s definition of a “search” within the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment turns on whether the defendant’s expectation of
privacy was reasonable. The Court’s definition of a “seizure” of the person
turns on whether a reasonable person in the defendant’s shoes would have
felt free to leave or terminate the encounter with the police officer.
Probable cause to search is defined as reasonable grounds to believe that
evidence of a crime will be found in the place to be searched. Officers can
conduct a Terry stop upon reasonable suspicion of criminal activity and
can do a Terry frisk of the person if they have reasonable suspicion that
the suspect is armed and dangerous. And, increasingly, the validity of a
search turns on whether the reviewing court believes the search was
reasonable.182

This should be unsurprising, since the text of the Fourth
Amendment refers to unreasonable searches and seizures. In the words
of the Court itself in Riley, “As the text makes clear, the ultimate
touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness.”183 The Court,
in fact, has spoken about reasonableness as the “touchstone of” the
Fourth Amendment in at least twenty-eight cases.184
182. Cynthia Lee, Reasonableness with Teeth: The Future of the Fourth Amendment
Reasonableness Analysis, 81 MISS. L.J. 1133, 1133–34 (2011).
183. Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2482 (2014) (citing Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398,
403 (2006)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
184. Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2482; (“As the text makes clear, “the ultimate touchstone of the Fourth
Amendment is ‘reasonableness.’”); Stuart, 547 U.S. at 308 (“the Fourth Amendment’s ultimate
touchstone is “reasonableness,” and “the ultimate touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is
‘reasonableness’”); Cnty. of L.A. v. Mendez, 137 S. Ct. 1539, 1546 (2017); Birchfield v. North Dakota,
136 S. Ct. 2160, 2186 (2016) (“reasonableness is always the touchstone of Fourth Amendment
analysis”); City of Los Angeles v. Patel, 135 S. Ct. 2443, 2458 (2015) (“the ultimate touchstone of the
Fourth Amendment is ‘reasonableness’”); Rodriguez v. U.S., 135 S. Ct. 1609, 1617–18 (2015) (“As the
text indicates, and as we have repeatedly confirmed, the ultimate touchstone of the Fourth
Amendment is ‘reasonableness.’”); Heien v. North Carolina, 135 S. Ct. 530, 536 (2014) (“the ultimate
touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is ‘reasonableness’”); Fernandez v. California, 134 S. Ct. 1126,
1132 (2014) (“the ultimate touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is ‘reasonableness’”); Bailey v. U.S.,
568 U.S. 186, 211 (2013); Maryland v. King, 569 U.S. 435, 436 (2013) (citing Samson to say that the
ultimate touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is “reasonableness, not individualized suspicion.”);
Missouri v. McNeely, 569 U.S. 141, 167 (2013) (“the ultimate touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is
‘reasonableness’”); Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 452, 459 (2011) (“[t]he ultimate touchstone of the
Fourth Amendment is ‘reasonableness’”); Michigan v. Fisher, 558 U.S. 45, 47 (2009) (per curiam)
(“the ultimate touchstone of the Fourth Amendment,” we have often said, “is ‘reasonableness’”);
Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 855, n.4 (2006) (“The touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is
reasonableness, not individualized suspicion”); Bd. of Educ. of Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 92 of
Pottawatomie Cty. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 822 (2002); Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 360
(2001) (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (quoting Mimms to say that “It is beyond cavil that “[t]he touch stone
of our analysis under the Fourth Amendment is always ‘the reasonableness in all the circumstances of
the particular governmental invasion of a citizen’s personal security.’”); United States v. Knights, 534
U.S. 112, 118 (2001) (“The Fourth Amendment’s touchstone is reasonableness” and “The touchstone
of the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness”); United States v. Ramirez, 523 U.S. 65, 66 (1998) (“Such
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In contrast to strict liability, reasonableness is also at the core of
negligence standards. Negligence standards build on the idea of
reasonable care.185 This connection makes it puzzling that the third party
doctrine operates like a strict liability standard. The dichotomy contained
within the third party doctrine is out of sync with the underlying
constitutional doctrine. Fourth Amendment case law should move to a
negligence standard. To do that, it could rely on social interactions.
C. A PROPOSAL: NORMAL SOCIAL INTERACTIONS RULE
1. Non-Dichotomous Privacy in Fourth Amendment Law
Rather than centering around the choice to expose information to
third parties, the Fourth Amendment jurisprudence should make use of
what constitutes normal social interactions to define privacy’s scope.
In other words, the relevant question should be what really reduces
the standard deviation of people’s beliefs further and what does not. This
would both better protect privacy and be more faithful to the aims of the
Fourth Amendment. In our model, disclosing information to one party
has only a small effect on an individual’s overall privacy. If Abby tells Ben
a secret, but not Caroline, then Ben’s bell curve will become tighter, but
Caroline’s will not. Abby’s overall privacy would be affected very little.
But if someone assumed that, just because Abby told that to Ben, she
agrees on telling it to anyone else, she would suffer significant privacy
harm.

execution is governed by the general touchstone of reasonableness that applies to all Fourth
Amendment analysis”); Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408, 411 (1997); Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33,–
34 (1996) (“The Amendment’s touchstone is reasonableness, which is measured in objective terms by
examining the totality of the circumstances.” Id. at 34. “We have long held that the ‘touchstone of the
Fourth Amendment is reasonableness.’”) Id. at 39; Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 250 (1991) (“The
touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness”); Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 185
(1990); Maryland v. Garrison, 480 U.S. 79, 87 (1987); New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 346 (1985);
Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1051 (1983); Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 108–09 (1977)
(“The touchstone of our analysis under the Fourth Amendment is always ‘the reasonableness in all the
circumstances of the particular governmental invasion of a citizen’s personal security’”); Hill v.
California, 401 U.S. 797, 804 (1971); Cty of Los Angeles, Calif. V. Mendez, 137 S. Ct. 1539, 1546 (2017)
(citing Birchfield to say that “Reasonableness is always the touchstone of Fourth Amendment
analysis”); see also California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 211 (1986) (“The touchstone of the Fourth
Amendment analysis is whether a person has a constitutionally protected reasonable expectation of
privacy, which involves the two inquiries of whether the individual manifested a subjective expectation
of privacy in the object of the challenged search, and whether society is willing to recognize that
expectation as reasonable”); Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 177 (1984) (“Since Katz v. Unites
States, supra, the touchstone of Fourth Amendment analysis has been whether a person has a
‘constitutionally protected reasonable expectation of privacy.’”).
185. Gregory C. Keating, Reasonableness and Rationality in Negligence Theory, 48 STAN. L. REV.
311, 312 (1996).
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The dichotomous conception of privacy (which primarily, but not
necessarily, results in concealment) should be replaced with a
continuous, and therefore more complete, account of privacy. Social
norms are already at the core of Fourth Amendment doctrine,186 but the
third party doctrine undermines their importance. The account of
privacy presented here shows that it is mistaken to think that because
someone is willing to reveal information to an intermediary, she is also
willing to risk revealing to the public. Changing this assumption would
transform the definition of a reasonable expectation of privacy under the
Katz rule from the third party doctrine to an analysis of normal social
interactions.
This idea of normalcy relates to the conception of privacy we
outlined above. When Abby discloses information to Ben, she knows it
will shrink Ben’s posterior, and she takes this privacy loss into account in
her decision to disclose. Suppose she understands that Ben is likely to
repeat the information. Then when she made her decision, she would
also have incorporated that additional utility loss into her cost of
disclosure. Social norms about information sharing are a way of
determining the likelihood that Ben will repeat the information.
Therefore, these norms reflect the fact that Abby had already taken that
additional (likely) privacy loss into account in making her disclosure
decision. This means that she is acting optimally.
This idea of normalcy is intrinsically tied to the negligence standard
discussed above. If Abby shares personal information with Ben in a way
that it would be normal for Ben to disclose it (either widely or to a single
individual) then Abby would have been negligent in her actions and
would not enjoy Fourth Amendment protection over that information.
She would no longer have a reasonable expectation of privacy over it.
However, if Abby conveys information to Ben in a way that it would not
be normal for Ben to disclose it (for example, because Ben is her
therapist), then Abby would have been diligent in her actions and would
have a Fourth Amendment protection over the information.
As the logical consequences of the third party doctrine look
increasingly untenable, a more nuanced concept of information privacy
is starting to permeate the Court’s Fourth Amendment privacy case
law.187 This is true despite the fact that the Court is still lacking a concrete
framework for this move. In United States v. Jones, for example, in
deciding the legitimacy of GPS tracking, the Court went beyond asking
what had been exposed to the public and found that, absent a warrant,
186. Colb, supra note 139, at 124.
187. See Stephen E. Henderson, After United States v. Jones, After the Fourth Amendment Third
Party Doctrine, 14 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 431, 431–32 (2013).
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such surveillance¾even in public¾violates the Fourth Amendment.188
Because Jones had ‘shared’ his location with others, applying the third
party doctrine in the case would have led to the opposite conclusion that
Jones had no reasonable expectation of privacy regarding his location.
Furthermore, the concurrent opinions in Jones more directly limit
the doctrine by stating that precise and pervasive monitoring of one’s
location in public violates the Fourth Amendment even without
trespass.189 In her opinion, Sotomayor noted that
[m]ore fundamentally, it may be necessary to reconsider the premise that
an individual has no reasonable expectation of privacy in information
voluntarily disclosed to third parties. This approach is ill suited to the
digital age, in which people reveal a great deal of information about
themselves to third parties in the course of carrying out mundane tasks.190

In Riley v. California, applying the doctrine would have led to the
conclusion that the information was not private because Riley was
receiving calls from someone else.191 The Court stated that “the ultimate
touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness”192 and focused
on whether the search was necessary to prevent the destruction of
evidence.193
Reconciling Katz with the third party doctrine is a puzzle. One
approach is to view the third party doctrine as protecting privacy as it
relates to copies of information, not as it relates to facts. Whereas in
Miller, for example, the bank had its own copy of the information,
tapping Katz’s telephone involved generating a new copy of that
conversation. Like the bank in Miller, intermediaries have their own
copies of information so, under this view of the third party doctrine, the
Fourth Amendment does not protect them.194 This is consistent with the
idea that the Fourth Amendment¾and by extension the third party
doctrine¾is concerned with the evidence about information, not with the
information itself. Under the model, evidence, including information
that is really being sought is the defendant’s “type” (normally, whether
the defendant is guilty). Because the third party doctrine is about

188. United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 404 (2012).
189. Jones, 565 U.S. at 413–21 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (Alito, J., concurring) (note that the two
concurrent opinions amount for five justices. If issued together, they would have constituted a majority
opinion against the third party doctrine).
190. Id. at 417 (citation omitted).
191. See generally Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014). Note that Katz was also speaking on
the phone when the Court found that he had a reasonable expectation of privacy. Katz
v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 348 (1967).
192. Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2482 (citing Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398 (2006)).
193. Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2482 (citing Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969)).
194. Conversation with Kathy Strandburg on Nov. 29, 2017. We thank her for pointing out this
interpretation to us.
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evidence, it is natural that its primary concern be with protecting signals,
rather than about protecting the underlying information. At the same
time, however, there is no basis for distinguishing, either in terms of the
expected informativeness of signals or in terms of the disutility to target
persons, between existing copies and other signals for the purposes of
Fourth Amendment protection. When Caroline observes a signal about
Abby, it makes no difference to Abby whether that signal is a copy of a
signal that Ben had already seen, or whether it was a new signal. Both
cases have the exact same effect on Abby’s privacy with respect to
Caroline.
Both Jones and Riley, as well as most of the academic proposals
regarding the third party doctrine so far, have focused on adapting the
doctrine to the new realities of the digital world. What we have shown
here is that the underlying problem is deeper than that. Technology can
challenge legal doctrine in two distinct ways. It can do so by presenting a
new problem that was absent before, like artificial intelligence
algorithms. Alternatively, it can make pre-existing problems more
salient, like ease of copying copyrighted works. Whereas most criticisms
of the third party doctrine place it in the first category, our approach
shows that it really belongs in the second. The third party doctrine has
always implied a misunderstanding of how society reacts to sharing
information. The emergence of intermediary-based communications did
not create a new problem, but simply increased the severity and the
salience of its already existing problem. The best legal response, then, is
not to adjust the doctrine to intermediaries but rather to use the
opportunity to replace it with something different that avoids this
fundamental problem.
In sum, the understanding of a reasonable expectation of privacy
should shift from the status quo¾a de facto a strict liability rule¾to a
negligence rule. The level of care employed in the negligence standard
should then look to how social interactions normally function.
Understanding normal social interactions will allow us to see what
expectations a person could reasonably have after sharing information
with another in the way she did.
2. Normal Social Interactions and Social Expectations
Defining reasonable expectations of privacy through the idea of
normal social interactions relates Fourth Amendment privacy law to the
common law of privacy in torts. In Dietemann v. Time, for example, the
Court found that there was intrusion upon seclusion because of the
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subterfuge of the means used to collect information.195 They were not
part of normal social interactions, just as Scalia observed in Kyllo that
gathering information with thermal technology was not.196 Neither is the
use of a pen register, the search method employed in Smith.197 Our
proposed rule therefore relates privacy, rather than to a strict liability
standard, to the idea of the reasonable person of ordinary prudence.
Law often defines people’s expectations. People expect others to
walk on the sidewalk in front of their homes, for example, but not on their
front yards. However, to determine their privacy expectations, people do
not look so much at what the law allows but rather evaluate what actions
are normal in the interaction that is taking place. For example, while it is
normal to consider what is and what is not at plain view,198 people
typically do not look to the applicable administrative law regulations.199
What is “in plain view” is determined by social uses, not the law, in the
same way that what is “in public” for the common law of privacy is
determined by what is accessible to the public, not by the formality of
whether the property was private or public.200
Returning to the two distinct interests protected by privacy law,
privacy and reputation,201 it is clear that the Fourth Amendment is
concerned with the former. The third party doctrine has privacy, not
reputation, as a conflicting interest limiting its scope. Inasmuch as the
Fourth Amendment cases are the constitutional equivalent of the
common law intrusion upon seclusion cases, it is easy to see how the
latter would look if the third party doctrine was applied to them. While
Nader, Dietemann, and Shulman were all successful in their intrusion
claims, under the third party doctrine (replacing “authorities” for “other
195. Dietemann v. Time, Inc., 449 F.2d 245,247 (9th Cir. 1971).
196. In Nader v. General Motors Corporation, on the other hand, the Court stated:
information about the plaintiff which was already known to others could hardly be regarded
as private to the plaintiff. Presumably, the plaintiff had previously revealed the information
to such other persons, and he would necessarily assume the risk that a friend or
acquaintance in whom he had confided might breach the confidence.
255 N.E.2d 765, 770 (N.Y. 1970); see also Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001).
197. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S 735 (1979).
198. For the plain view doctrine, see generally Harris v. United States, 390 U.S. 170 (1984). For its
extension to the open fields doctrine, see generally Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170 (1984). For
its limit, the curtilage doctrine, see generally United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294 (1987).
199. A case in which the law could create an expectation of privacy is when privacy is contractually
agreed. Courts have generally stopped short of recognizing this due to the third party doctrine. DANIEL
J. SOLOVE, NOTHING TO HIDE¾THE FALSE TRADEOFF BETWEEN PRIVACY AND SECURITY 108–09 (2011).
However, in some cases, such as United States v. Warshak, contracts have been used to define
expectations of privacy when they can be used against it, when there is a clear provision in terms of
service reserving a right. 631 F.3d 266, 320 (6th Cir. 2010).
200. For example, one can be “in public” in a shopping mall, or in one’s balcony, but “in private”
on the side of the road behind some protection that impedes others from seeing one.
201. See supra Subpart III.A.
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third parties”), none of the plaintiffs would have been successful.
Thinking of intrusion upon seclusion cases such as Nader, Dietemann,
and Shulman in terms of the third party doctrine sheds light on its
underlying problems.
Carpenter illustrates this point as well. While Carpenter might have
been aware that his telephone provider can identify his location, he surely
would not have thought it normal for this information to be passed on
along to other parties. As such, under a normal social interactions rule,
Carpenter would likely be held to have taken due care regarding his
geolocation information. In contrast, a ruling in Carpenter that
effectively established a strict liability rule would create incentives for
people to take inefficient and socially undesirable levels of care regarding
their geolocation. The social outcome of having every person take such
high levels of care, leaving their phone at home every time they do not
want to be followed by anyone, is likely to outweigh the social benefit of
not having to ask a judge for a warrant when this information is valuable
in criminal procedure.202
Much of the discussion of the case has centered around whether the
third party doctrine extends to long term tracking.203 But the case is an
opportunity to do something more useful and important: recognizing
how longer term tracking is yet another example of the flaw at the root of
the third party doctrine. Instead of relying on voluntary disclosure to a
single party to form a conclusive presumption that the disclosing party
has no reasonable expectation of privacy (thereby taking us out of the
general Fourth Amendment approach of “reasonableness”), we should
consider the effect of voluntary disclosure as part of the general
reasonableness inquiry. That is: Was it reasonable to assume that the
third party would disclose the information to other third parties? Is the
government’s search regime otherwise reasonable?
CONCLUSION
We presented a simple characterization of information privacy that,
aims to capture the impact of information on privacy loss and privacy
harm. Our model is designed to emphasize the aspects of privacy that are
relevant for law, particularly in light of technological innovations that
changed the way in which people acquire, store, and disseminate
202. Cf. Balkin, supra note 136, at 1231 (explaining, for the proposal of information fiduciaries that
“[t]his conclusion does not mean that the government may not obtain the information at all. The
government may still use warrants upon a showing of probable cause. Or the information may fall
under one of the exceptions to the warrant requirement.”)
203. Transcript, supra note 163, at 4 (petitioner’s attorney stating that “the rule we seek is that
longer-term periods or aggregations of cell site location information is a search and requires a
warrant”).
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information. We then apply our model to the privacy tort and draw an
analytical and doctrinal distinction between the two types of interests it
protects. We then turn to the third party doctrine, and use insights from
our model to overcome what is perhaps the most criticized element of
Fourth Amendment law.
In the tort law context, we use the model to distinguish between
privacy and reputational interests in privacy law. While only the first is a
true privacy interest, the second can be protected by privacy rules, even
if it is not itself a privacy interest. We then divided the four privacy torts
between these two interests, and showed how this model can help to
make sense of the existing doctrine. Finally, we analyzed how this
impacts the interaction between privacy and the First Amendment, the
role of truth as a defense against a privacy claim, and the evidentiary
requirements of the privacy tort.
The model also helps identify a root problem for the third party
doctrine and clarifies why some of the existing suggestions to overcome
its counterintuitive results¾such as the existence of options and the
concept of information fiduciaries¾might be insufficient. We then use
insights from the model to propose a better way forward, which is
consistent with the concurrent opinions in Jones and the majority in
Riley: to move from a strict liability rule to one based on what is
reasonably expected from social interaction. Carpenter represents an
opportunity for the Court to alter the current doctrine dispensing with
the third party doctrine and replacing it with a substantive view of
reasonable expectations of privacy of the Fourth Amendment.
The applications of the model discussed in this paper represent just
a few examples where differentiating between privacy loss and privacy
harms has cognizable legal consequences. As privacy concerns become
increasingly important, and problems involving privacy loss become
more prevalent, our model can serve as a useful tool in evaluating privacy
harms in other areas of the law as well.

MATHEMATICAL APPENDIX
A. THE BASELINE MODEL
1. Formalization
Suppose that there is a continuum of individuals, each endowed
with a type q on the interval I. Denote A’s type as q * . Define B’s prior
about A’s type as p (q ) , where p (q ) is a probability density function

F - COFONE-69.4.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

May 2018]

5/26/18 1:11 PM

PRIVACY HARMS

1091

(pdf).204 For simplicity, assume that p (q ) > 0"q Î I .205 Suppose further
that B can observe N independent and identically distributed unbiased
signals about A. Denote each signal j in B’s information set as X j , and
let the realization of each signal j be x j . Denote X = [ X1 , X 2 ,..., X N ]T and

x = [ x1 , x2 ,..., xN ]T . Since the signals are unbiased, we have that
E[ xi ] = q *"xi Îx .
Define

the

joint

conditional
Using
206
updating, B’s posterior pdf is given by

h(x | q ) = f ( x1 | q ) f ( x2 | q )... f ( xN | q ) .

k (q | x) =
where g1 (q ) =

pdf
of
standard

X
as
Bayesian

h(x | q )p (q )
g1 (q )

¥

ò h(x | q )p (q )¶q . Denote the standard deviation of this

-¥

posterior pdf after observing N signals by s N .

We model A’s privacy as s N , the standard deviation of B’s posterior
given the N signals in B’s information set. For any 0 £ k £ N , as B’s
information set increases from ( N - k ) signals to N signals, A’s privacy
loss is given by L( A, N , k ) = s N -k - s N .
2. Baseline Model
In our baseline model, we assume that both B’s prior and the signals
that he observes are drawn from a normal distribution, which allows us
to use standard formulas to characterize B’s posterior distribution. Doing
so implies some loss of generality,207 but allows us to generate clearer
intuitions. Later, we relax some of these assumptions, and the main
intuitions are unchanged.
Suppose that while B cannot observe A’s type directly, he knows that
the distribution of types in the population as a whole is normal208 with a

204. For an introduction to probability density functions, see ROBERT V. HOGG, JOSEPH W. MCKEAN
& ALLEN THORNTON CRAIG, INTRODUCTION TO MATHEMATICAL STATISTICS 45 (6th ed. 2005).
205. This ensures that A’s type could lie anywhere on I with at least some positive probability.
206. HOGG ET AL., supra note 204, at 579–89 (6th ed. 2005).
207. The loss of generality come from the fact that we have specified the shapes of the distributions.
208. A normal distribution is also known as a Gaussian distribution, or a bell curve.
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mean of µ0 and a standard deviation of s 0 .209 This implies that the
interval I is ( -¥, ¥ ) .210
Before he learns anything about A, the best B can do is assume that
she looks like the population as a whole. His prior is that her type is
drawn from the distribution of types in the population. As a result, his
best guess about her type is that it is equal to µ0 , the population mean.
Now suppose that B can also observe informative signals about A. In
particular, suppose that B observes N independent and identically
distributed signals drawn from a normal distribution centered around q *
with a standard deviation of s. Let

xN =

1
N

N

åx
j =1

j

be the sample mean, and s N the standard deviation of x N .
As B observes signals, he updates his beliefs and forms a posterior
belief about A’s type. In this example, it can be shown that B’s posterior
distribution is also a normal distribution, with a mean of

µN =

s 02
2
s +s
2
0

xN +
N

s2

N
2
s +s
2
0

µ0
N

and a standard deviation

( s N )s
(s N ) + s
2

sN =

2
0

2

2
0

=

s 2s 02
.
s 2 + Ns 02

The mean of the posterior, 𝜇# , is a weighted average of the prior
and the observed signals. As the number of signals increases, ceteris
paribus, the posterior converges toward the sample mean. More
importantly, as the number of signals increases, the standard deviation

209. This

p (q ) =

distribution

has

ìï (q - µ0 )
exp í2s 02
2ps 02
îï
1

2

a

probability

density

function

üï
ý
þï .

210. This comes from the fact that the normal distribution has infinite support on the real line. In
the case of a prior with finite support, I would be some finite interval. Changing this interval has no
effect on the intuition of the model.

F - COFONE-69.4.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

May 2018]

5/26/18 1:11 PM

PRIVACY HARMS

1093

of the posterior, s N , falls.211 Eventually, as N approaches infinity, the
standard deviation falls to zero. Moreover, as N approaches infinity, the
sample mean x N converges to the true mean 𝜃 ∗ . At that point, A has no
privacy at all.
3. Preferences over Privacy
Formally, A’s utility function over privacy is defined as a function
that is increasing and concave in the standard deviation of B’s posterior
distribution. This captures the intuition that individuals prefer more
privacy to less (other things equal), but they do so at a decreasing rate.
Let 𝜎 be the standard deviation of the distribution, and let y be a
composite good. The utility function is defined as 𝑈(𝜎, 𝑦), where
+,(-,.)
+-

> 0 and

+1 ,(-,.)
+(-)1

< 0. The curve in Figure 2 below represents a

utility function for privacy that satisfies these criteria.

211. To see this, notice that

¶s N
<0
¶N
.
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Figure 2: Example of a privacy utility function

4. Preferences over Privacy vs. Preferences over Signals
We noted in Part II.B.1 that, while Abby’s utility over privacy is
assumed to be concave, her utility over information may not be.
To see this formally, notice that we can write

¶U (s N , y) ¶U (s N , y) ¶s N
=
¶N
¶s N
¶N
and
2

¶ 2U (s N , y) ¶ 2U æ ¶s N ö
¶U ¶ 2s N
=
+
.
¶N 2
¶s N 2 çè ¶N ÷ø ¶s N ¶N 2
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These two equations characterize how a change in the number of
signals that Ben observes affects Abby’s utility. The former, which
represents the derivative with respect to N, characterizes the effect of an
increase in the number of signals on her utility, while the latter, which
represents the second derivative, characterizes the effect of such a change
on the slope of that function. It can be shown that under our simplifying
assumptions from Subpart A.2, Abby’s utility is decreasing in the number
of signals Ben receives.212 More importantly, under the same conditions,
the effect of N on the second derivative is, in general, indeterminate. This
implies that, while Abby has concave preferences over privacy, she may
have convex preferences over signals.
B. EXTENSIONS OF THE MODEL
We now discuss a few extensions of the basic model. In the above
discussion, we assumed that B knew the population distribution of 𝜃, and
that A had full information. We now relax these assumptions.213
1. Uninformed Prior
What if B does not know the population distribution? For example,
perhaps he honestly knows nothing at all about how types are distributed
in the population. Alternatively, perhaps it has never occurred to him to
even think about this until now.

212. To see this, recall that

sN =

s 2s 02
s 2 + N s 02

so that

¶s N
< 0.
¶N

213. We also assumed that both the signals and the prior were normal and independent and identically
distributed. Both of these assumptions can be relaxed.
The assumption that the population distribution and the signal generating process are normal is made
for simplicity. Conceptually, nothing relies on this assumption. Relaxing this assumption, we lose the
closed-form solution for the both the mean and standard deviation of the posterior. The latter is more
inconvenient as it, in turn, means that we lose the closed from solution for A’s privacy loss. While this
loss is inconvenient, it is not fatal. For any given prior 𝜋(𝜃), and any given conditional joint probability
density function of X ℎ(𝒙|𝜃), we can simply calculate the posterior 𝑘(𝜃|𝒙). Define 𝜎8 as the standard
deviation of 𝜋(𝜃), and

sN

as the standard deviation of the posterior. Then A’s privacy loss in moving

from the prior to the posterior is given by L( A, N , k ) = s 0 - s N . For any given 𝜋(𝜃) and ℎ(𝒙|𝜃) these
standard deviations can be computed using a standard statistical formula. See, e.g., ROBERT V. HOGG
ET AL., INTRODUCTION TO MATHEMATICAL STATISTICS 59-60 (6th ed. 2005).
The assumption of independent and identically distributed signals is another mathematical
convenience. If instead the signals are independent and not identically distributed, we will simply have
a different function for ℎ(𝒙|𝜃). Conceptually, nothing will change. Even the independence assumption
is also not particularly important. We can accommodate arbitrary correlations between the signals by
simply redefining the ℎ(𝒙|𝜃) function to
ℎ(𝒙|𝜃) = 𝑓(𝑥= |𝜃)𝑓(𝑥> |𝜃, 𝑥= ) … 𝑓(𝑥# |𝜃, 𝑥= , 𝑥> , … , 𝑥@A= )
Here again, while this accommodation may introduce tedious calculations, the interpretations and the
intuitions are unchanged.
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In such cases, we propose that the most appropriate prior is a
uniform distribution. This puts equal weight on every possible outcome,
which seems the most reasonable way to think of the problem in the
absence of any other information.
2. Uncertainty
What if A is uncertain about B’s prior and/or posterior? In other
words, what if A does not know with certainty how much B already knows
about her? Alternatively, (or additionally), what if A does not know with
certainty how much B will learn about her from observing k additional
signals?
We can address both of these issues by borrowing from the
machinery already developed for dealing with risk and uncertainty in
economics. In particular, we assume that U (s , y ) is a well-defined Von
Neumann-Morgenstern utility function. Because A is uncertain about
s N and s N -k , she simply uses her best guess about how likely any
particular value of s N and s N - k are. Her utility is then given by her
expected utility over these possible values.214
3. Multidimensional Types and Privacy as Context
In the baseline model, we assumed a unidimensional type θ on the
(unidimensional) interval I. The model can easily be generalized to allow
multidimensional types. For example, suppose that θC P-dimensional
vector representing A’s type, where each of the P elements represent a
sub-type. The signals that B observes are now P-dimensional vectors, and
rather than having a single standard deviation, we have a P-by-P
covariance matrix Σ. A’s privacy loss is now defined with respect to each
sub-type. For each p in P, A’s privacy loss is now the incremental
reduction in the square root of the pth diagonal entry of Σ.
Similarly, the baseline model focused on the case where there is only
one homogenous class of observer, and modeled both privacy loss and
utility over privacy in a single context. While we believe that this
simplification is a useful benchmark, it is straightforward to generalize
our model to one that incorporates privacy in different contexts. Rather
than defining the utility function over a single standard deviation term,
214. For example, suppose A believes that there is a 50% chance that

s

N - k is 0.5, and a 50% chance
that it is .75. Suppose that in either case, there is a 25% chance that after receiving k additional signals,
the variance of B’s posterior will fall by 50%, and a 75% chance that it will fall by 25%. A’s expected
1
utility ex ante is therefore 1
, and her expected utility ex post is
U (0.5, y ) + U (0.75, y )
2
1 é1
3
3
1
1
3
ù 1 é1
ù
U
.5*.5,
y
+
U
.5*.75,
y
+
U
.75*.5,
y
+
U
.75*.75,
y )ú , or U (.25, y ) + U (.375 y ) + U ( .5625 y ) .
(
)
(
)
(
)
(
ú 2 ê4
8
2
8
2 êë 4
4
4
û ë
û
2
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we can generalize it to be defined over several terms. Formally, if an
individual is concerned with privacy in P different contexts, the utility
function is simply 𝑈(𝜎 , 𝑦), where
¶U (s p , y )
>0
¶s p
and

¶ 2U (s p , y )
¶(s p )2
some 𝑝 ∈ 𝑃, s = [s1 ,s 2 ,...,s P ]

T

<0

is a P-dimensional vector, and s p

represents the standard deviation in each context 𝑝 ∈ 𝑃. Figure 3
illustrates a simple example of a utility function that satisfies these
characteristics where P=2.

Figure 3: Example Utility Function Incorporating Context
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This generalization allows for a tremendous amount of flexibility.
Not only does it allow the individual to put different weights on privacy
in different contexts, it also allows for preferences that depend on the
interactions between privacy in different contexts. For example, an
individual might care about relative levels of privacy, or might only care
about privacy in certain contexts, but not others.
This generalization to contextual privacy is mathematically
equivalent to our formalization of multidimensional types. We view this
as a feature of the model. While there is no question that the conceptual
meaning behind the two formalizations are distinct, the mathematical
machinery we develop allows us to capture both. This makes our model
both adaptable and parsimonious.

